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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (17 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 70B019

26 June 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Theo. C. Mataxis, Chief, Army Section, ARMISH/MAAG, Period April 1968 to May 1970 (U)

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2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Theo. C. Mataxis, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
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
ARCS (23 May 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: End of Tour Report

HQ, ARMISH-MAAG, APO New York 09205 27 May 70

TO: Special Assistant For Special Warfare Activities, DA, Washington,  
D. C. 20315

The attached End of Tour Report by Chief, Army Section, ARMISH-MAAG, is an excellent and comprehensive evaluation of objectives, achievements, and the problems pertaining to the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. Insofar as overall advisory matters are concerned, the report is addressed from the viewpoint of the Army Advisory Section and in certain instances does not give full consideration to the various requirements and priorities which must be addressed by the Chief of Mission.

FOR THE CHIEF:

  
KENNETH A. WARD  
COL, USA  
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION WITH IRANIAN ARMY  
AND  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP TO IRAN  
APO NEW YORK 09205

ARAA

23 May 1970

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report

THRU: MG H. A. Twitchell  
Chief, ARMISH/MAAG  
APO New York 09205

TO: Special Assistant for Special Warfare Activities  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20315

In accordance with CINCSTRIKE Directive 612-2, dated 21 August 1969,  
attached is the End of Tour Report of the Chief, Army Section, ARMISH/  
MAAG for the period April 1968 to May 1970.

FOR THE CHIEF ARSEC:



REX T. DITTAMORE  
LTC, USA  
Army Section, ARMISH/MAAG

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**FORMAT**

This Report is organized with an Introduction and three Sections. The Introduction stands by itself as an overview of the entire Report which highlights and summarizes the key areas of interest. The Sections which follow expand this information in a manner suitable for use by the appropriate headquarters. Section I lists those areas where progress has been made. Section II notes the current or continuing projects of primary interest at this time between ARSEC and the IIGF. Section III indicates those areas where relatively little or no progress has been made and the reasons therefor. Naturally there is some overlap; however, I feel that this sequence best presents the efforts of the Army Section (ARSEC) of ARMISH/MAAG over the past two years. Unfortunately, due not only to the rapid turnover of personnel, but the lack of overlap of key personnel, records retirements, SOPs, and the drastic cut in the JTD, the "institutional memory" of ARSEC leaves a lot to be desired. Therefore, it is urged that the reports of the former Chiefs of ARSEC also be used in comparing the situation as it has developed over the past 6 years, particularly in regard to the changes caused by transition from a MAP to a Sales environment during the past two years.

It is interesting to note that the three problem areas noted by my predecessor - Command Relations, Personnel, and Logistics, remain today as areas where advisory efforts need to be concentrated. I, however, would add two extra areas: that of Training, and Force Structure Planning. Under Training I would stress not only reorganization and improvement of the schools and training base, but also field training which is primarily under the aegis of the ARSEC Field Advisory Teams. Under Force Structure Planning the need for a national level plan outlining priorities of utilization of resources between civilian and military sectors of the economy is a first priority. Following this, an overall military plan analyzing the needs of each service and assigning priorities of development to each service is mandatory. Otherwise unilateral service efforts in this area will remain on a year-to-year basis with future planning remaining at best, a rough estimate.

Similar as the problems appear to those of previous years, caution must be taken when applying "lessons learned" from past MAP experiences to ensure that the solutions proposed fit the current "sales climate." The changes caused by the transition from MAP to Sales affect the entire gamut of ARSEC's responsibilities. They range from "evolutionary", requiring only modification of existing SOPs, to "revolutionary", requiring a complete restructuring of existing relationships and methods of operations.

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**INTRODUCTION (C)**

**1. BACKGROUND**

a. This Report covers the period 17 April 1968 to 23 May 1970, the period of my service as Chief, Army Section, ARMISH/MAAG. During this period, one of the most important developments has been the transition of Iran from a MAP recipient to a Sales customer with all of the nuances that such a changed relationship would entail. As has been mentioned, the changes caused by this shift have been far-reaching. They vary from slight changes in MAP schools programming where existing MAP schools courses have been supplemented by the "purchase" of additional courses by the IICF, to other areas where Iran is selecting from among active competitors products in competition with the material available for sale by the US. Under these conditions it is felt that the old MAP "ground rules" useful in dealing with a "client" be reanalyzed and a completely new set of ground rules be developed.

b. During this period of time, the strength of ARSEC has been reduced by nearly 60%, as a result of two personnel cuts (30% of JTD 1970 and 29% of JTD 1971). Therefore a major concern has been how to balance remaining personnel strengths against a basically unchanged level of personnel requirements. To accomplish the objectives listed in the pertinent sections of USSTRICOM Manual 795-1, my approach to the problem has been to attempt to identify problems and categorize them into the following three major areas:

(1) Those pertaining to HQ IIGF general staff, planning, programming and management.

(2) Those pertaining to field advisory duties, field army planning, management, stressing combat-readiness.

(3) Those involving advisors and advisory assistance to the IIGF schools system and training base.

Within these three general areas current conditions have required that HQ ARSEC give priority to general staff advice to CG, IIGF and his staff, and staff support of the ARMISH/MAAG J-Staff. The responsibilities for field advisory duties has been divided into the major categories of field advisory duties performed by the Field Advisory Teams (FATs) and periodic staff visits and support furnished by HQ ARSEC. Advisory assistance to the schools system has been accomplished by full-time advisors at seven schools and part-time advisors from HQ ARSEC at others.

c. During the last few months of this period, increased interest has been evidenced by the CG, IIGF in obtaining additional assistance in reorganizing the IIGF schools. An initial analysis and "in house" reorganization in ARSEC

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placed full-time advisors at the Signal School, Infantry School, and the Command & General Staff College. This resulted in a total of 7 schools where a full-time advisor is assigned, the others being Armor, Artillery, English Language, and Aviation Training Center. Most recently at a meeting between Chief, SCS; CG, IIGF; and Chief, ARMISH/MAAG and myself, the CG, IIGF reiterated his desire to upgrade the schools and focused initially on upgrading the C&GSC. This is being approached on a priority basis. The Chief of FAT-2 is assigned temporarily to head a steering committee to analyze instruction at the C&GSC and to "Iranize" the problems now copied from the US C&GSC instructional material and to integrate more practical exercises and field training into the curriculum.

d. The magnitude of the advisory task is best illustrated by the following example. Under present staffing, the ratio between ARSEC advisors and the IIGF is 1 to 2,700. ARSEC is responsible for dealing with 41 installations with a battalion size strength, 11 depots, 3 Army HQ, IIGF HQ, and 5 school centers - a total of 61 separate installations. In addition, ARSEC deals directly with the chiefs of technical services. While the strength of ARSEC has continued to be reduced, the mission requirement has remained unchanged. Over the years the level of field advice has moved from battalion to brigade, to division and today is at field army level. The most recent personnel reductions have drastically limited the resources available to the Army Section and required a very careful analysis of its ability to attain all of the normally assigned advisory objectives noted in USSTRICOM Manual 795-8, dated 8 August 69, titled "Military Assistance Program Advisory Concepts" plus those new requirements developed as Iran moved from a MAP to a Sales environment. According to the systems and priorities established, ARSEC has attempted to concentrate those remaining resources where experience has indicated that assistance is required and where ARSEC believes the most progress can be achieved. The transition of Iran from MAP to Sales has resulted in a gradual shift in emphasis and responsibilities of the Army Section in many fields, in order to be more responsive to the needs of the IIGF which have developed as a part of this new state of affairs.

e. In view of several attempted coups d'etat in the Middle Eastern countries, plus the current psychological "crisis climate" in Iran (caused by the Arvandrood western border incident) HIM has tasked the IIGF "Not to be surprised, and to defend the western borders." Very careful consideration has to be given to arranging ARSEC priorities in a manner which will meet not only the normal requirements for advice and assistance to the CG, IIGF, responsiveness to higher US headquarters, but also to be responsive on a "crash basis" to special requests. These special requests have ranged from specifics such as teaching classes in mine warfare, to more comprehensive demands to increase our advisory efforts at the schools.

f. As a result of reductions in the JTD, and the change from a MAP to a Sales Program, ARSEC has now reached a strength that any future reductions would probably eliminate Field Advisory Teams (FATs). I question this approach.

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In my professional judgement I consider that there exists today as much of a need for field advisory operations as at any time in the past. I recognize it is not now possible to have the large detachments at unit level that once existed, but I feel that for the foreseeable future ARSEC must maintain contact at field army level, where general staff level advice in planning, management, training supervision, and maintaining combat-readiness, still needs the assistance of advisors. Advice at this level and at the service schools is necessary if ARSEC is to correct these deficiencies which have a substantial impact on the capabilities of the IIGF to accomplish its assigned missions.

g. As noted in HQ STRICOM Manual 795-8, the advisory techniques utilized will vary from country to country depending on local circumstances and psychology. I believe that to be responsive to the requirements of the new Sales era, the HQ STRICOM Manual should be divided into 2 separate parts, one dealing with MAP and one with Sales. In the section dealing with advisory techniques for Sales countries, it must be recognized that the "leverage" we had when we furnished the equipment under MAP is gone. We now have a new situation, where methods and procedures will have to be developed for each of the separate countries with which we deal under Sales.

h. It is interesting at this point to note the local problem of command relationships which were highlighted by my predecessor's report. Under "Command Relationships" he noted in 1968:

"Command Relationships. The most serious problem confronting the IIGF is that of its relationship with SCS. There is no clear, precise statement of the missions and functions of each headquarters. Consequently, there is great duplication and overlap, since SCS is manned mostly by IIGF officers. Its very size makes the SCS staff seek responsibilities; unfortunately, many accepted already are those of the IIGF, since they must be performed in order to operate the IIGF. Two general solutions have been suggested for this dilemma. One, to eliminate the IIGF Headquarters completely and have SCS control directly those elements now reporting to IIGF; the other, to reduce the SCS to a small coordinating, planning and policy staff. It is my opinion that either solution would work; however, it is said that the mission of the SCS is to be a small personal staff to HIM; if this is the case, then only the second solution is feasible. Whatever the solution, the SCS staff must get out of the daily operating business and must refuse to accept problems for decision that should be solved at force level. To approach the problem logically, all missions and functions of both headquarters should be set forth; then only those missions and functions that could not be performed by IIGF should be given to SCS. Work on this has started but is being carried on as an unimportant matter. Until and unless this matter is resolved, IIGF HQ is doomed to continue to appear unresponsive and unable to solve its own problems."

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There is in being today a statement of functions and responsibilities of the two headquarters; however, the problem is further complicated by the special relationships which the chiefs of each service and the Gendarmerie have with His Imperial Majesty. Having direct contact with HIM, sometimes on a weekly basis, the service chiefs at times discuss and receive decisions on matters which are only then brought to SCS attention. It must be recognized that in Iran the SCS does not operate as does our Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in fact acts more as HIM's personal military staff to supervise joint and special operations. This system makes it most difficult to effectively develop long-range plans since the responsibilities and functions of the IIGF and the SCS have not been clearly defined. In other words, this is still a major problem area. The current efforts of CHARMISH/MAAG to develop a national level plan for allocation of resources between the services, should help in resolving the most troublesome of these problems. Until then the planning will continue to "limp along" on a year-to-year basis.

i. Here in Iran, for reasons noted above, I consider it mandatory to continue to retain ARSEC's advisory effort at the FATs and service schools on practically a coequal basis with the headquarters in Tehran if we are to remain effective. For example as recently as 1966 it was necessary to reconstitute the field teams after, as an experiment, they had been replaced by a roving team from ARSEC HQ. This contact at field army is essential if the advisory effort is to be effective at higher levels of command, otherwise we will operate in a vacuum at HQ IIGF in ignorance of the "real world" problems that exist in the field elements of IIGF.

j. Regardless of the initial opinion of the new arrival in this part of the world -- who will see many, many things which must be done -- progress has been, and is being made. I urge that when evaluating this progress or lack of progress, the observer consider his observations in appropriate terms of reference, such as the situation as it existed 6, 4 or even 2 years ago. Here again the past reports of the former Chiefs of Army Section will be most useful; however, it must be emphasized that during this period, the change to a Sales environment will have modified in itself some of the past experiences.

k.. Another factor which must be carefully considered is that we are not trying to make the IIGF a "mirror image" of our army, but to assist it in utilizing our system as a point of departure to develop techniques and SOPs which are designed to work most effectively in Iran. As an example, in considering logistical requirements here in Iran, we do not need the tremendous general support backup that we see in our own army. The support required must be evaluated in terms of the mission and capabilities of the forces supported, and plans must be developed now to utilize to the maximum the existing civilian resources such as trucks, repair shops, hospitals, etc., in case of mobilization. For these reasons, the combat capability of the IIGF must be evaluated in terms of the Indo/Pak and/or the Arab/Israeli conflicts as possible future conflicts for Iran may be of a similar duration.

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(1) In light of the foregoing and the recent border crisis with Iraq, the IIGF has been advised to take the following action. First, to concentrate its current forces of two armored divisions and one infantry division with such additional reinforcement as can be made available from the remainder of the IIGF, into a "ready reaction" force capable of fighting effectively against the threat to Iranian oil fields in the Khuzistan area and the western border, with marginal or minimal effort to the north and east. The remainder of the IIGF would then stay a second priority force to be brought to full strength with personnel and equipment as these resources become available.

(2) Second, to plan their buildup with a view toward building a force which they can equip, train, and support effectively over the next several years. Here the normal five year plan has been modified by the desire of the CG, IIGF to concentrate on a two year plan designed to bring his forces to the highest level of combat-readiness by the time of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971. With this priority, the development by the IIGF of the remaining 3 years of the 5 Year Plan is viewed as "tentative" to be re-addressed and modified on a yearly basis and on a lower priority than the initial 2 years of the 5 Year Plan. With this in mind, I consider their tentative plan for approximately 5 to 6+ divisions (if one considers the Guards Division) supported by proper air and artillery to be within their capability if the training base is expanded and manned to support the expansion and if proper planning for force development is also accomplished and not constantly changed, as has been done in the past. Whether these plans can be accomplished within five years is very questionable. In order to do so, priority must be given to resolving the personnel problem, expansion and improvement of the training base and improvement of the logistical system. Time will not permit the necessary facilities to be constructed prior to expanding the training base. Accordingly, they must "double shift" the existing classrooms to fulfill the training requirements. Every effort must be made to staff the schools with the best officers and NCOs available. I urge that continuing emphasis be placed in this direction until such time as the 6+ division force structure is realized. Also I urge that the history of re-organization of the IIGF be a subject of considerable research before changes in current concepts are made. The IIGF is critically short of trainable manpower and this shortage will be the overriding consideration for years to come. In spite of this, their current force structure planning appears to be valid if the steps noted are taken on a priority basis.

(3) In conjunction with this planning, it also has been recommended that a mobilization plan be developed. This plan must not only provide fillers for existing units but also create organized reserve and territorial units which, making optimum use of ex-service personnel, armed with bolt action rifles and other older equipment, would serve as "backup" for the regular forces.

1. Considerable emphasis has also been placed on the need for inspections. This year, ARSEC was asked to, and participated in, the Imperial Household Inspections in First, Second, and Third Armies. While the results of this

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participation cannot be evaluated at this time, it is felt that joint ARSEC/IIA inspections and commissions (committees) continue to be one of the most remunerative of our advisory activities.

m. Following is an overview organized by staff sections of the major areas of interest. These resumes are expanded in the sections which follow

### **2 PERSONNEL**

a. As previously stated, the overriding problem for the IIGF is a lack of trainable manpower to man the sophisticated equipment associated with a modernizing army. To-date, although they recognize the need for a personnel program that will produce the required trained manpower, no overall integrated national level manpower program has been developed which will set priorities to the IIA for this trained manpower so they in turn can establish their internal priorities among the services. Such a program requires changes to existing laws and accordingly is sometime in the future On the positive side, the IIGF now, for the first time, has an effective MOS system for classification and assignment purposes. In its infancy, the system suffers the growing pains -- lack of understanding and inaccurate reporting -- that any new system entails. The IIA and in turn the IIGF, is also aware of the need for a better system of training evaluation and promotion of their officer corps and is attempting to revise the present system. It is the unanimous opinion of not only ARSEC but HQ ARMISH/MAAG that the major issue here is the need to increase the pay of the regular officers and NCOs in order to attract the required numbers of qualified personnel.

b. The Imperial Iranian Military Academy is the only military academy in Iran. Its mission is to train and commission all new regular officers for the IIA. Although ARSEC has had an advisor designated for the IIMA, they have been extremely reluctant to cooperate with the advisor. Most recently the advisory responsibility was assumed by a US Colonel, USMA graduate assigned to the J-Staff ARMISH/MAAG. ARSEC considers that major renovation and updating of the curriculum, as well as overall facilities, is mandatory. The current program is 3 years in duration and the bulk of the subject material is in basic military sciences as opposed to a heavier academic schedule. Within the past year English Language has been included in the curriculum. This is a major improvement and the long-range benefits should make the program extremely valuable. The IIMA cannot supply the required number of officers for the IIA. Accordingly, augmentation by ROTC is a must. Recently a system of priorities of assignment of graduates has been proposed. Evaluation of this system must be made in the future.

c. The ROTC program will provide the "fill" of LTs for the IIGF and will assist in meeting the overall officer shortage if appropriate training is given these officers. Senior commanders must carefully motivate them, assign them, and continue to monitor their training while they are on active duty.

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Also, the CG IIGF's "Modernization Plan" for his NCO corps and extensive use of conscript NCOs is a step in the right direction. However, as previously stated, the key is increased benefits which in turn will produce career attractiveness and retention.

d. The system of inspections used in the past, failed to place adequate emphasis on the critical area of personnel management. Within the past year, the Third Army has utilized personnel management teams to cover this void. Reports confirm a vital need for a system to validate MOS qualifications and utilization of personnel. Until such a system is realized, there is no way for the IIGF to accurately know their training needs. Hence the school loading plans based on the need of field units, will continue to be a guess. Constant emphasis in this area is most important as past plans have revealed that personnel is the overriding consideration in assessing IIGF's capability to implement a given plan.

e. During the past year, IIGF has expanded their English Language Program from a single training center to include five additional schools and training centers. These are: the IIMA, C&GSC, National Defense University, Aviation Training Center, and their Counterintelligence Center. All students at other than the English Language School, are required to study English 3 hours per week for the duration of their course. ARSEC is enthusiastic about this program and if proper command emphasis is maintained, it can have one of the most salutary effects on the training base of any program now in effect.

### **3. PLANS, TRAINING, AND INTELLIGENCE**

a. Force Planning. As in the case of personnel, the major problem facing the IIGF in the area of planning is the lack of management data on which to base their plans. There are no systems now in effect that develop the necessary personnel and logistic management data on which realistic force structure plans can be built. Again, IIGF is aware of this problem and they are attempting to develop such a capability, hopefully to be expanded to an ADP system in the future. The benefits to be gained by such a capability are numerous, but here again the benefits will not be realized for a period of from at least 2 to 5 years. In the meantime, IIGF must continue to plan on the basis of information available. In this conjunction, the IIGF has recently recognized the need for a staff element to carry out force structure planning and it has organized within its staff an "Organization Committee" (ACSFOR) to handle this task. As the embryo ACSFOR continues to operate, its personnel will become more experienced and techniques will be developed which should expedite future force planning.

#### **b. Training.**

(1) Due to problems in individual training and school loading, the IIGF has recently appointed a Deputy Chief for Individual Training and organized

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a DCSIT office. This office is responsible for the overall management of individual training in the IIGF. This includes standards, inspections, and scheduling. This capability should give them the necessary ability to plan school loading and better utilization of the in-country training capability.

(2) The IIGF has recently decided that AIT should be conducted in the units rather than the training centers. ARSEC recommended against this procedure, but since it was ordered by CG IIGF, it has been recommended that DCSIT assume the overall responsibility for AIT once the change in the training concept is made. The CG IIGF has accepted this recommendation and planning is now underway to ensure standards and inspection of the AIT program. If this is not done, each division will approach the problem differently with the resultant lowering of combat-readiness.

(3) Unit training is conducted on an annual basis and culminates in ATTs for battalion level units and those below battalion level. These are based on the US Army's annual training test concepts. Unit testing above battalion level is accomplished as in our army. Brigade and higher level units conduct FTXs under the direction of a maneuver director and are controlled by senior general officers.

### **c. Master Objectives Plan.**

(1) There is in being a Master Objective Plan (MOP). This is a STRICOM requirement and should be the management tool utilized to evaluate progress. During my tour I have urged the MOP also be the basis for our advisory role in field advisory teams, as well as in staff sections at ARSEC. The field armies and in turn the IIGF, conduct quarterly reviews and analysis. At these sessions the MOP objectives are reviewed in some detail. However, it must be realized that in a Sales environment the process of developing a MOP has been changed considerably with the host country assuming a much larger share of responsibility for its development.

(2) The change in the IIGF command has outdated some of the MOP insofar as some of the objectives previously established are no longer valid. As a result, I have urged each of the FAT Chiefs to coordinate with their Army Commanders to establish objectives within the framework of the command guidance given by the CG, IIGF which was that he wanted objectives which stressed "combat-readiness." Thus each army commander should develop objectives as they pertain specifically to his area of responsibility. As a result, the MOP being utilized may be different within each of the army areas. Ideally, such a plan should be developed at the highest levels and should be the basis for all command and management actions. Unfortunately this is not the case at this time. While the MOP, as now operating, leaves much to be desired, it is the main basis for an effective tool of management and should not be discarded because of its present difficulties but should be an area for future coordination on a priority basis between ARSEC and the IIGF to bring the IIGF and Army level MOPs into line. This approach has worked since the CG, IIGF on 2 May directed his staff to coordinate MOP objectives with ARSEC.

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d. Intelligence Training. The IIGF conducts its intelligence training at a centrally located school in Tehran. As a result of the Arvandrood (Shatt-el-Arab) incident and the resultant IIGF alert, the need for adequately trained intelligence personnel became apparent in the First Army, while the Third Army had no known problems. Here again, assignment and utilization of personnel appeared to be the key. As a result of the recent reductions in strength in ARSEC, the Army Section's intelligence advisory function was absorbed by the J-Staff and the ARSEC G-2 Advisor space was deleted. Due to this cut, intelligence advice is being concentrated at the FATs and ARMISH/MAAG levels with the ARSEC G-3 as coordinator

### **4. LOGISTICS**

a. It is here that the sales program has had a revolutionary and not evolutionary effect. While ARSEC is still responsible for maintaining a record of past MAP equipment, it is evident that the method of operation to support an aid program and a sales program, requires an entirely new approach. Currently, the logistics effort suffers from the lack of modern management techniques and trainable manpower. While item accounting at a particular supply installation is practically infallible, there is no system that develops national level management data from which military priorities can be developed by service. The lack of such a system makes long-range planning and budgeting progress within the IIGF practically impossible and these plans when developed are extremely suspect as to their accuracy and capability to be effectively implemented.

b. The IIGF faces the usual supply and maintenance problems of the modernizing nations and these are further complicated by the introduction of sophisticated equipment such as helicopters and of third country equipment. Lack of an in-country training capability for this third country equipment both from the user and maintenance aspects, has an extremely adverse effect on the IIGF. There is no overall plan in being to overcome this deficiency and to integrate all equipment into a single system. Third country equipment causes additional problems to the field forces in that it is often not compatible with US equipment. This is particularly true in signal and ordnance equipment.

c. The IIGF logistical system has undergone its fair share of organizational problems. They have today the technical services organization common to our own army a few years back, which they should retain until a workable functional system to replace it has been designed. They have recognized the need for a central point of contact at IIGF level and have established a Deputy for Logistics. A further reflection of the new sales requirements is the establishment of a IIGF liaison officer in New York to supervise the operations of a Freight Forwarding Agent. Currently they are making progress in the ADP area and have purchased through FMS the services of two ADP specialists for a period of one year. This assistance, coupled with the assistance ARSEC has been able to acquire, has begun an effort to mechanize

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their supply system. The fruits of this venture will not materialize in the near future. It is estimated that if the program receives adequate command support and they are able to get the trainable manpower required, the system may begin to produce in a period of from 2 to 5 years and this is only a beginning.

d. One of the major programs in the IIGF today is the establishment, in Iran, of an M-47 retrofit and wheeled vehicle rebuild capability. When this facility is operational, it will provide a capability the IIGF has not had in the past. While the retrofit of these tanks is important in the short time frame, the long-range benefits as it applies to their depot maintenance capability is the overriding consideration in pushing the project.

e. In addition to the Imperial Household Inspections previously discussed, ARSEC has stressed the need to conduct comprehensive inspections. The IIGF conducts an annual CMMI which is taking the place of their former systematic inspections. While this CMMI is not as complete as in our own army, it is a positive step forward in being able to evaluate equipment on hand, maintenance procedures, and should give the commander the status of the combat-readiness of the unit from a logistics standpoint.

f. (1) Another void that exists in the IIGF is the lack of their utilizing their in-country civilian capability to assist them in research projects. Some progress has been made in this area through the Combat Research Evaluation Committee (CREC) and representatives of the Research Triangle Institute under contract to the IIGF through ARPA. Additionally, the local representative of the International Executive Service Corporation has been contacted and made aware of the need for their type of assistance in the IIGF. Hopefully, the end product will be for the IIGF to begin getting assistance, i.e., Operations Research, from their universities and thus recognize the reservoir of assistance available through their own civilian agencies. However, at this point in time I am not sanguine over the prospects of rapid expansion in this field. This effort is worthwhile and if approached on a low key long-range basis it should be successful.

(2) As an interim measure CREC can develop a file of information on equipment being considered for barter or purchase from the US or third countries. In addition, CREC can be tasked to supervise the testing of the various competitive systems in Iran before making a final decision on which to acquire.

(3) Another appropriate field for CREC is the development of in-country resources for the IIGF. An example of this is the development and testing of the 106mm gun jeeps, ambulances and the production of 24-volt signal jeeps, at the Akhavan Jeep Company in Iran.

5. COMPTROLLER.

a. Comptrollership in the IIGF is essentially the budget and fiscal operation we knew in the time frame prior to 1949. While a visit to their

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office will show the normal comptroller organizational structure, for the most part the divisions other than budget vary greatly from our standards. Financial reports (disbursing) are not rendered through comptroller channels and there is no monetary accounting associated with the supply and maintenance activities. Thus, the overall or integrated financial data available in our services is not available in the IIGF and management at all levels suffers as a result. The comptroller field also suffers from lack of qualified personnel, and systems to develop data available. The problem is recognized and they are attempting to hire qualified civilians to fill the personnel void.

b. Improvement of systems now in effect is contingent on a national plan, since all systems must mesh at that level to provide a data base on which planning can be based and priorities established. For this reason, the impetus in comptrollership must be at this time at the ARMISH/MAAG J-Staff level. Once the problem has been resolved at this level, it can then more effectively be tasked at service level. Accordingly, the ARSEC comptroller advisor positions were deleted from the JTD effective 1 July 1970. Once an effective system is established at SCS it would then be appropriate to consider reestablishing a comptroller position in the ARSEC JTD.

c. Present budget procedures in IIGF are on an annual basis without the benefit of a 5 Year Program. Within the administrative guidelines received from SCS, IIGF prepares and submits its budget for the coming fiscal year. For the most part the budget concerns itself with maintenance of the present force. Construction requirements are budgeted for and funded by the Plan Organization based on IIGF stated requirements. Personnel programs (pay and allowances) are financed by the open allotment concept and administered by the Adjutant General and Chief of Finance.

### **6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

a. The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area, possible tribal irredentism, and border problems with Iraq, all pose problems to Iran that probably makes our advisory role to the IIGF more significant today than at any time in the past.

b. The IIGF is making progress. Today they have in their inventory some of our most sophisticated equipment which they maintain and operate. During the recent border incident, on a crash program of reordering of priorities, cannibalizing existing units of both personnel and equipment, the IIGF moved units the length and breadth of the country to meet the threat. These moves were accomplished in a highly professional manner and units met their mission requirements. Perhaps most important, this exercise highlighted deficiencies which must be corrected if the combat level of the entire IIGF is to be raised to the level of the deployed troops.

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c. The IIGF is continuing to modernize their forces. With this modernization, the requirement for long-range planning becomes paramount in order to ensure that personnel, facilities and monetary capabilities exist. This requirement is recognized by the IIGF and they have taken steps to overcome their present deficiencies in the area of planning. However, the basic requirements -- personnel classifications and strength accounting data, and logistical maintenance and supply data, are not yet developed. Until this data is readily available on a factual basis, the IIGF long-range force structure planning capability will suffer.

d. (1) Now that Iran has to depend on her own financial resources in a Sales environment, the ordering of financial priorities in "cutting the pie" becomes extremely important. Since the problem of establishing national priorities for resources extends beyond the scope of not only ARSEC but ARMISH/MAAG, and cuts across the entire spectrum of governmental interests, I feel that requirements for input to such a study must first be developed at the highest levels of government, and this is currently being done. In turn, the agency placing the requirements must have in being a system for collecting the needed data and have a plan for analyzing and utilizing the data in the decision process. Such a program will require outside help, since I feel that ARMISH/MAAG does not possess the capability to accomplish this additional monumental advisory task and still carry out its present mission.

(2) While unilateral efforts have been made in the past by ARSEC to support ARMISH/MAAG's efforts to establish a series of costs for a five year program, the figures utilized have been so "soft", being obtained by guesses and estimates since they weren't available from IIGF sources, that the actual value of the whole study at this stage except as an in-house document, is open to question. While worthwhile as an in-house effort to establish "ball park" figures, the use of these "estimates" outside ARMISH/MAAG is, I feel, extremely dangerous, since higher headquarters may lose sight of the "questionable source data" and use the data as firm planning figures.

(3) The Country Team and ARMISH/MAAG are attempting to encourage interest in developing the costing for a Five Year Plan for the Iranian military. Hopefully this, if adopted at a national level and directed to be followed up by the services, will improve the long-range planning procedures. However, it must be recognized that at present the IIGF does not have an organization that has the data, or can gather the data to a degree of accuracy that is comparable to our own system. The development of such management techniques will take several years and must be carefully integrated from national to SCS and then down to service levels, if it is to be a viable system.

(4) ARSEC, in conjunction with the J-Staff, IIGF, and SCS is presently costing the current force structure plan. As previously stated, while the timing for attaining this plan may be in excess of the 5 years

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desired, the plan is believed to be feasible, provided actions as noted previously, are taken. Since the CG, IIGF has stated that his major concern is what can be accomplished in the next two years, as the critical date is the withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf area, it must be recognized that development of this two year plan continues to have priority in the IIGF.

e. (1) One of the most vexing problems remains the allocation of present advisory efforts between "current operations" and future planning efforts. It is believed that the following example will assist in clarifying the magnitude of the ARSEC advisory role. The total current capital invested with the US by the IIGF (MAP and FMS) is estimated to be one billion dollars. When this amount is measured against a yearly tranche buy of approximately one hundred million dollars for all of the IIA, the fact that the IIGF has approximately 150,000 out of a total of 215,000 military personnel in Iran's forces; that out of the 1349 (1970) budget of \$532 million, IIGF gets \$304.3 million, or 57% of the total, one can better understand the importance of the ARSEC advisory role. It is believed that in line with the accepted management practice of insisting on maximum return for the manhours invested and dollars expended, that management of this investment dictates that an appropriate share of the advisory effort should continue to be placed on current operations.

(2) In view of the importance to maintain a sound economic structure which will support both operations of the civilian and military section, it is recognized that steps must be taken to assist in the development of a sound plan at governmental level. To do this and at the same time continue our service advisory, training and management efforts to improve the combat capability of the IIGF which is so important to Iran, I feel we will need additional outside skilled manpower assistance to the Country Team.

f. In line with this, it is felt that as the inevitable future cuts are made, that the advisory and liaison effort at the schools and the two field army headquarters on the western border, be retained, ARSEC HQ could handle directly at a reduced level the requirements of the Second Army HQ in Tehran. With the unique place of the Field Army commanders in the IIGF and the direct relationship of the service commanders with HIM, it is felt that it would be dangerous to "pull back" field advisory effort and deeply cut service advisory efforts to concentrate on future planning. In the real world that we operate in today, advisors with the IIGF field commanders, schools, and the IIGF staff are still needed. These commanders are faced with the planning and day-to-day operational requirements of running a force in being. As the ARSEC TD has been reduced, advisory assistance has suffered. This ordering of the advisory priorities between current advisory assistance to the force in being versus planning, particularly long-range planning, will become, in my view, one of the key problems of the current advisory effort here in Iran. Whatever is done, I feel the key to success is remaining responsive to the service chiefs whom we advise.

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g.. The key to being an advisor is to understand the country's history, customs, and if possible its psychology. Based on my experience as Senior Advisor to II Corps, in Vietnam, for sixteen months and twenty-five months as Chief of the Army Section here in Iran, I believe that the best vehicle we had with which to prepare an individual for this duty, was the Military Assistance Institute. When this facility was closed, a real void in training was created. I understand that the school was often criticized, but wouldn't it have been better to correct any deficiencies than to close the facility? I believe it would. The present system of orientation by a few day's TDY at the Pentagon or HQ STRICOM, in discussions with desk officers who may or may not have been in Iran, is not sufficiently in depth to properly prepare the officer. I strongly urge that consideration be given to re-establishing a similar type facility at the John F. Kennedy Special Forces Training Center. Such a facility could be staffed by retired personnel who have had outstanding careers in the advisory business. The present school overhead could probably provide the support required with minor modifications to the TD. This recommendation is made understanding that there is now a plan to create a career field for advisor personnel. However, this is the long-term method of satisfying the problem. In the interim, a real need exists to replace the MAI facility and this need is now.

h. Finally, I urge that STRICOM Manual 795-8 be revised soonest to reflect the desired advisory role and duties in a "Sales" as well as a "MAP" environment.

*Theo. C. Mataxis*  
THEO. C. MATAKIS  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief, Army Section

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**SECTION I - AREAS OF PROGRESS (C)**

a. This section of the report is devoted to those areas where ARSEC feels that progress has been made. As stated in the introduction, evaluation of this progress must be made in appropriate terms of reference such as the situation as it existed in the IIGF six, four or even two years ago. I am certain that the new arrival will be impressed with the lack of management data available to the CG, IIGF. As previously stated, this problem is recognized and steps are slowly being taken to rectify it.

b. In the personnel area a MOS system has been instituted and through the use of personnel management teams, training of personnel officers, and staff visits to the field, steps are being taken to make this system an effective and reliable one. While much work remains to be done in this area, there is day-to-day progress.

c. In planning, training and operations the major problem exists in the planning portion and it, in turn, is directly related to the availability of qualified personnel. Here again, the IIGF recognizes the problem and is attempting to solve it. A major step in this direction was taken when the CG, IIGF organized an Iranian ACSFOR, as a general staff section on his staff, to plan for the development of required force structures for the ground forces. Over the past six months this section's efforts in the force development field have been frustrated by constantly changing goals and guidance. The most recent guidance the CG, IIGF gave this section was to concentrate on requirements for the next two years with the goal of improving the combat readiness of the units in being. As the planning capability improves in all the IIGF staff sections, there should be a general improvement in the quality and quantity of training as this capability should ensure an improved capacity to utilize and to further develop in-country training methodologies.

d. In the field of logistics, and as a result of a memorandum of understanding signed in 1964 by the GOI and the USG, the US provides items for the IIGF under Foreign Military Sales (FMS). As of 15 November 1969, FMS had a programmed total value of 242.8 million dollars. The final grant aid items to be provided to Iran are scheduled to be completely delivered by 30 June 1970. The transition from grant aid support to military sales for Iran has been accomplished. IIGF requirements which are within its budget are forwarded direct to ARSEC and then to ARMISH/MAAG. Large requirements and Tranche or credit purchases are submitted to the IIA Foreign Purchase and Orders Department and then to J-4, ARMISH/MAAG. During the past two years a number of actions taken by the IIGF has resulted in some improvement in the present logistical system. Eventually these actions will result in the forming of a modern logistical system that will be fully responsive to IIGF needs.

e. Outlined below are the major projects now underway in the IIGF.

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**SECTION IA - PERSONNEL**

a. (U) Officers

(1) Limited use of conscript officers in assignments heretofore not utilized has begun. These include instructors in Farsi language for illiterates and in English language at all Training Centers, the English Language Center, and at posts, camps and stations in branch immaterial positions, i.e., as laundry and bakery supervisors, assistant engineer and signal officers and in general administration. This program is planned for expansion on receipt of the ROTC inputs starting in 1970. Thus, a measure toward improvement of quantity and quality in officer procurement has been initiated.

(2) The IIGF is able to train additional personnel within its own resources by the utilization of US MAP trained officers for a two year utilization assignment at their branch school. These officers improve in-country schools instruction by increasing the professional qualifications of instructor personnel and ensuring a flow of up-to-date doctrine.

(3) A revised officer efficiency report has been adopted which when properly used will act as a management tool to measure work performance and reflect a more positive evaluation of officer efficiency.

(4) ARSEC assisted SCS in the development of a battery of validating tests for the selection of colonels to fill brigadier general positions and definitive evaluation forms to assist in the final selection for promotion to BG.

b. (U) NCOs

(1) A program has been approved and instituted for the employment of certain conscript high school graduates under a 5-year contract to be trained in hard skill MOS. These NCOs will be paid special monies and called HOMAFARS. Initially, there were 34 undergoing training to fill missile maintenance positions in the Sheridan Program until the program was cancelled by the GOI. These NCOs are now being trained in communications MOS for the purpose of upgrading training at the IIGF Signal School.

(2) The IIGF is identifying both the trainable and least effective NCOs. The least effective NCOs and untrainable NCOs are being eliminated from service. Those trainable NCOs not being effectively utilized are being retrained and reassigned to combat and combat support commands. Also, a program has been initiated which replaced certain cadre NCO positions in the TOE with conscript NCOs.

(3) Because of low service pay and increasing competition from civilian industry, difficulty has been experienced in recruiting qualified personnel for the regular NCO corps. To offset this problem an incentive program in

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the form of proficiency pay was developed and approved for a limited number of hard skill MOSs. Incentive pay is also being developed as combat pay (within stated distance of frontier and in specific combat units).

c. (U) MOS Accounting and Utilization

Officers and NCOs are being classified. Inventories are being prepared periodically which will allow the IIGF to definitively plan the number, by MOS, of persons to be trained each year. Personnel Management Teams have been formed in each army area to make periodic inspections for the purpose of ensuring proper utilization of personnel by MOS. In addition, these teams check the personnel data forms (NP-2), assignments and MOS utilization.

d. (U) Identification

During the past year, the IIGF, through the use of multigraph machines and identity tags has instituted a vigorous program to issue identification tags (similar to those used by US personnel) to all IIGF personnel.

e. (U) English Language Training

The English Language Program being conducted within the IIGF has contributed immeasurably to the overall effectiveness of the IIA. Added emphasis over the past two years has resulted in English language instruction being expanded from one to six separate school locations based on highest usage intensity. This language capability has directly assisted in the equipment modernization program within the IIGF and enhanced training proficiency progression.

## SECTION IB - PLANS, TRAINING & INTELLIGENCE (C)

a. IIGF Reorganization

(1) Upon my arrival in April 1968, ARSEC had a full-time advisory committee working on the reorganization of the IIGF. This committee helped in the formation of a plan that included a skeletonized 7 1/2 division force. This plan was termed the TAJ Plan. Basic guidance given the committee was that combat units were to be manned at 80% of its officer and NCO and 100% of its enlisted TOE strengths while the training base and logistical units were to be filled to 100% of TOE authorizations in all three categories. Due to lack of trained manpower and due to constantly changing guidance these goals were never met. The TAJ Plan basically was not placed into effect.

(2) In April 1969, the international situation between Iraq and Iran deteriorated to the degree that some IIGF units were deployed to the western border of Iran. A number of problems were noted as a result of this deployment and to correct these HFM directed that a new reorganization be accomplished. The new force was to contain two armored divisions, one infantry

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division and an airborne brigade. These units were to be modeled on the US ROAD division and these divisions plus other combat elements were to be fully supported by combat and combat service support elements. To assist the IIGF in the planning incident upon such a reorganization, ARSEC developed a troop list and station plan as well as a concept for the required planning stages. In the meantime, the Chief, ARMISH/MAAG requested that ARSEC independently develop a five year financial management plan so as to have an approximate estimate of the costs involved in the IIGF developing such a force. A by-product of this plan was to indicate to the appropriate staff sections of the SCS the importance of and the techniques used in proper staff planning. This financial management plan was completed in September 1969. The study revealed that there was a dearth of basic cost factors and management data to the extent that this plan was useful only as an indicator to designate problem areas in the IIGF's management field. At best, the costs developed were "best estimates".

(3) During the initial stages of the current reorganization planning, ARSEC was successful in convincing the CG, IIGF of the need for an ACSFOR as a general staff section. It is believed that this was a major accomplishment because former force planning had been accomplished by Ad Hoc Committees operating on a "crash" basis to satisfy an immediate requirement. This staff section of the IIGF has completed approximately 90% of the TOEs required to support the force goal and in similar fashion it has developed a reasonably realistic plan for the activation of required combat units. On the other hand its progress has been hampered considerably by constant changes in objectives and in force additions.

b. IIGF Schools and Replacement Training Centers

(1) On 1 December 1968, the CG, IIGF informed me that he was considering returning the responsibility for Individual Training from Hq Third Army/Training Command to the IIGF. I strongly supported this concept because it would facilitate the establishment of centralized control over training and should act to upgrade the level of this type of training. Further, the Hq Third Army/Training Command had been in existence for about a year and had shown it could not adequately cope with the numerous problems in this key area of training. The IIGF initially established the office of DCSIT as a staff section and adopted the US concept of training that runs the gamut from BCT to AUT plus ATTs and FTXs. In addition, an increased use was made of US POIs in the training base elements and the IIGF requested an increased level of activity on the part of US advisors. Further, the IIGF on several occasions requested the forming of joint teams to inspect and delineate problems in aspects of the training base so corrective action might be taken. The IIGF also increased its construction program to accomplish needed improvements in training base facilities.

(2) In January 1969 the IIGF completed its adoption of the US concept of training by finalizing arrangements for the Office of DCSIT to operate under the Deputy Commanding General for Training at Hq IIGF. This organization, patterned on DCSIT, US continental Army Command, provides the centralized control at IIGF level needed to direct and supervise all aspects of individual

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training. Initially DCSIT was assigned not only the responsibility for individual training but that for advanced unit training as well. Later this latter responsibility was shifted to G-3, IIGF.

(3) In August 1969, the IIGF completed its adoption of the US concept of training by conducting BCT at replacement training centers, followed by AIT or Common Specialist Training (CST). BUT and AUT were conducted in units and this training was followed by FTXs and ATTs.

(4) DCSIT, IIGF embarked on a comprehensive translation program converting all US School POIs into Farsi in an attempt to provide new POIs to each school. In this case and in contrast to former efforts to write POIs, the new POIs are adapted to meet the peculiar requirements of the several IIGF schools. Despite this positive advance, the problem of directly translating US POIs and other training publications without consideration for the capabilities or needs of the IIGF still exists. ARSEC must continue to emphasize the necessity to adapt to Iranian needs the US training documents that are used by the IIGF.

(5) IIGF became more aware of the limitations and the multiplicity of problem areas in the training base as a result of the control provided by DCSIT. In addition, increased emphasis on training on the part of the CG, IIGF and ARSEC served to isolate many problem areas. Some of these areas included increased needs for ranges, barracks, training aids of all types and classrooms. While some construction work has been accomplished, it has not kept pace with needs of the part of the training base.

(6) The technical service schools of the IIGF are all located in Tehran. During my tenure as Chief, ARSEC, many of these schools have been relocated one or more times. In some cases the schools have been moved without any prior planning. The IIGF is again planning to move most of its technical schools to Tabriz. Apparently this is in answer to HIM's expressed desire to relocate some military installations out of the greater Tehran area.

### **c. Master Objective Plan (MOP)**

(1) The MOP served as an excellent tool for orienting new arrivals relative to specific areas in which IIGF was focusing its attention. The emphasis given the MOP was greatly enhanced both by the ARSEC Quarterly Report to A/M and the IIGF, quarterly Review and Analysis. In addition, an annual updating of the MOP required CG, IIGF and Chief, ARSEC to review the effectiveness of the MOP of the previous year and determine feasible objectives for the forthcoming five year period.

(2) The MOP progressed mainly because of emphasis from both IIGF and ARSEC. The following cites specific factors which greatly promoted the MOP in each organization.

(a) IIGF: The quarterly Review and Analysis complemented the MOP because the status of each objective to include progress, shortfalls and

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proposed corrective actions were presented during each conference. In addition, key commanders and staff officers from IIA are present at these conferences. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Commander or his representative to be present periodically.

(b) ARSEC: The MOP was used as a daily means of promoting subject areas which would elevate the professional caliber of IIGF. The management and supervision of the MOP was expanded to the FATs which required them to prepare field Team MOPs. The quarterly review, annual updating and the ARSEC participating in the Review and Analysis demanded sufficient time to appoint an ARSEC, MOP coordinator. In addition, in order to properly manage and ensure timely reports, it was necessary to prepare an ARSEC MOP Adm Memo.

(c) As noted in the introductory remarks, the MOP today is not just an IIGF document. Each of the Army Commanders have been tasked to prepare MOP objectives that stress "combat readiness". For this reason, the MOP may now vary from army area to army area and does not reflect an overall IIGF plan for accomplishing tasks. I feel however, that the MOP should not be discarded but rather should be the basis for future coordination between ARSEC and IIGF to bring the IIGF and Army MOPs into agreement.

### **d. Intelligence**

(1) The IIGF G-2 Section has established a weather reporting system within the IIGF that services all major units on a 24-hour basis. This has proved to be of considerable benefit for IIGF aviation and for ground combat units.

(2) This period also saw the completion of a 1:50,000 map series of Iran plus 1:100,000 photo maps of some adjacent countries. A program was also initiated for systematic road and terrain reconnaissance that should provide field army commanders with current information to update terrain studies. The IIGF is, in addition, maintaining terrain studies of some countries bordering on Iran.

### **e. Aviation**

(1) The IIGF aviation program has made considerable progress in the past two years. Two major hanger facilities were completed in Tehran and Esfahan and plans were prepared for the erection of other major aviation facilities in Tehran, Esfahan, Kermanshah and Shiraz.

(2) In early 1968, the IIA purchased 40 UH-1H helicopters from the Agusta-Bell Corporation of Italy. The IIGF received 36 of that purchase. The contract also included the training of 100 pilots and 185 maintenance personnel.

(3) In late 1968, and disregarding advice of ARMISH/MAAG, the IIA decided to purchase 100 Bell Jet Ranger helicopters from the Agusta-Bell Corporation of Italy. The IIGF was allocated 70 of this buy with the

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balance being furnished other IIA agencies and services. The purchase contract included provisions for the training of Iranian instructor pilots who, in turn, would train other Jet Ranger pilots as required. The IIGF was given the mission of training required personnel for the other agencies and services.

f. Airborne Brigade

The IIGF Airborne Brigade was cut as a result of the TAJ Plan from a three to a two battalion force. Within a few months of this cut instructions were issued to reconstitute it as a three battalion brigade plus the required combat and combat service support elements. The brigade has conducted numerous FTXs at the battalion level but these invariably include only one company conducting a vertical assault while the battalion minus participates in a road march or tactical vehicle move to the linkup point or objective area. Such FTXs often include an armor unit to assist in effecting linkup. To date, these FTXs have been conducted less heavy equipment as the brigade does not possess a heavy drop capability. Recent efforts to obtain equipment requirements attendant upon a heavy drop capability have resulted in a sales case being signed. This sales case will result in the needed equipment being provided from the US. The airborne brigade has completed type load planning for the C-130 aircraft but not, as yet, for the C-47 aircraft or a mix of C-130 and C-47 aircraft.

g. Signal

(1) As a result of ARSEC recommendations the IIGF purchased the services of three (3) US Army Electronics Command Technicians under Foreign Military Sales Case UGE. Each of these technicians worked closely with IIGF and ARSEC personnel for 90 days to accomplish the following:

(a) Study and analyze the capabilities and training requirements of the Signal Training Center and make recommendations for complete modernization and improvement of this training facility. Plans are being formulated by IIGF to implement these recommendations. This includes provisions to build a new Signal Training Center as soon as funds can be obtained. As a result of extensive ARSEC effort this has become one of IIGF's priority projects.

(b) Study and make recommendations for the modernization of all Signal repair and maintenance facilities. The Chief of the IIGF Signal Department has already begun to implement recommended improvements in this area. An FMS case has been executed to provide the needed quantities of tools and test equipment.

(c) Study the Integrated National Telecommunications System (INTS) to ensure that it will be constructed within appropriate specifications which will facilitate interface with tactical communications equipment and provide multichannel access for IIGF units. Estimates were developed which outlined the types and quantities of mobile equipment required and the

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personnel needed to give IIGF a tactical interface capability with the INTS when it is completed. Based on advisor recommendations IIGF has been provided 24 sets of 12-channel radio relay equipment and 58 sets of 4-channel radio relay equipment through MAP.

(2) ARSEC persuaded USAECOM to provide at no cost to the Iranian Government an avionics maintenance technician for 60 days to study IIGF avionics operations and maintenance and make recommendations to upgrade the repair and maintenance facilities. Some progress has been made in sending personnel to the US for training. IIGF has made plans to purchase tools and test equipment when funds become available to upgrade these facilities.

(3) A study was made of the minimum essential signal equipment needed to provide the IIGF with command and control communications. In this study communications diagrams were developed to provide IIGF with guidance on the integration and utilization of old and new series US radios as well as third country equipment currently issued to their combat units.

(4) Recommendations were made and coordination effected which provided for the testing of 12 to 24 volt DC to DC static convertors so that 24-volt US radios could be used on 12-volt MAP provided vehicles and Russian vehicles. IIGF initially purchased 650 of these convertors and subsequently has increased the total quantity ordered to 2550.

(5) Through ARSEC efforts twenty AN/GRC-26 radios were obtained under grant aid to augment IIGF's limited communications capability. It was recommended that these sets be used in garrison communications networks thus releasing other mobile AN/GRC-26 radios for their intended tactical role. Plans are being made to implement these recommendations.

(6) Obtained the following USAECOM representatives and a mobile training team to provide operation and maintenance training for IIGF.

(a) Mr. McIver on two occasions made liaison visits to Iran to deprocess the 4 and 12-channel radio relay equipment and to conduct required maintenance training for IIGF Signal Depot Personnel.

(b) Mr. Razes was brought to Iran to inspect and repair the 28 US purchased AM/GRC-122 Radio Teletype Sets and to provide on-the-job training for Signal Depot Personnel.

(c) An enlisted Mobile Training Team was obtained from the US to teach Radio Relay operations to personnel at the Signal Training Center.

(7) It was strongly recommended to CG, IIGF that he vigorously support the establishment of basic electronic instruction in certain selected high schools so that these personnel would be able to absorb the hard skilled MOS training at the IIGF Signal Training Center or in US Service Schools. As a

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result of this recommendation and that of J-6 ARMISH/MAAG, HIM has allocated 3.5 million dollars to establish a basic electronics course at Pahlavi University in Shiraz.

(8) It has been recommended to CG, IIGF that the Signal Training Center be placed under the direct command and control of the Chief, IIGF Signal Department, and that the subject training facility not be moved outside of the Tehran area. Both recommendations were accepted and defacto implementation has resulted.

(9) ARSEC provided a signal officer to assist the J-6 ARMISH/MAAG in the study and design of the INTS to ensure that proper channels and priorities were incorporated in the PTT Plans to provide the IIGF with necessary Command and Control Communications when the system is completed. Approval of the INTS concept has been given and work has started on the construction of this project - a communications package which will cost the GOI 192 million dollars.

**h. Artillery (ADA and Field)**

(1) During the past 2 years within the ADA considerable progress has been made. The major accomplishments were the (a) establishment of a single agency management of Drone Program and Tow target capability for air defense training, (b) utilization of excess (48) 40MM AA guns for coastal defense, (3) organization and deployment of two 57MM ADA Bns and five 23MM ADA Batteries, (4) development and publication of air defense rules of engagement and SOP.

(2) The major accomplishment in the area of Field Artillery was the development of a plan for non-divisional artillery force structure.

(3) Due to shortage of artillery officers, ARSEC has suggested the IIAF 3d LT Program be utilized to provide the bulk of new officers for the upcoming ADA expansion.

**i. Inspection System**

The IIGF has introduced an inspection system designed to provide uniformity throughout the Ground Forces. Annual training tests will be conducted by headquarters two levels above the tested unit. The Imperial Military Household will conduct the annual general inspection of all units which will include a combat readiness exercise. Each field army will also conduct an annual CMMI supervised by G-4 and the IIGF inspection section.

**j. Tables of Organization**

The ACSFOR, IIGF was tasked with the requirement to prepare new tables of organization for all in-being units and for those planned to be added to the troop list. As a base the US "G" Series TOE has been used for this, however,

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it has been adapted to meet the IIGF requirements. TOE development, though slow, is proceeding satisfactorily.

### **k. Civic Action**

(1) Civic Action projects have encompassed education, medical aid, rural development, health and sanitation, and vocational training. Specific statistics are included in the Civic Action Annex to the Military Assistance Plan for Iran. The assistance rendered by the IIGF during the earthquake in Eastern Iran in 1968 and the floods in 1969 were outstanding examples of Civic Action.

(2) (a) The civil-military relationship has improved. This is evidenced by the cooperation and willingness of civilians to aid the military in unconventional and conventional FTXs. Also personnel from the literacy, rural development, and education corps are well received by civilian society. The increased voluntary enrollment of civilians in the programs of the various corps is further evidence of improved relationships.

(b) The government control in remote areas has been improved through civic action teams from various army units going into remote areas to provide medical treatment and veterinarian treatment in addition to other localized projects. The IIGF is responsible for providing the paramilitary training required for all members of the Revolutionary Corps (literacy, Rural Development, Health and Sanitation and Vocational Training). The placing of these personnel from the various corps in remote areas to carry on activities in their respective fields has greatly assisted the populace. Additionally, these personnel have served as means to allow grievances to be brought before the government. They also serve as listening posts for the government.

(c) Economic development has been enhanced. The vocational training program has taught needed skills to soldiers who use them upon their return to their villages after release from military service. This program provides technical schooling during the draftee's last 3 to 6 months of his military training. In addition, roads have been built or improved allowing farmers to market their produce. Levees, irrigation ditches, and walls have been dug, further increasing economic output. It is nearly impossible to place a monetary value on the economic improvements that have resulted from the Civic Action program, but it has been substantial.

### **l. Advisory Schools Support**

In response to request by CG, IIGF for additional school advisory support, Chief, ARSEC realigned the internal structural organization of ARSEC in order to provide full-time advisors at crucial locations. Currently, full-time advisors are assigned at the Armor, Artillery, and Infantry Schools, Defense Language Institute, Signal School, and C&GSC. The latter two positions were added during the current fiscal year in order to fulfill the immediate needs of IIGF. In addition, a part-time advisor was assigned to each of the other

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schools. The merits of this program produced immediate results as numerous problems which impeded qualitative training were isolated. The mandatory weekly visits of advisors to their respective schools created an awareness among the various commanders that ARSEC was not only interested in identifying problems but earnestly desired to assist in formulating appropriate corrective action.

**SECTION IC - LOGISTICS**

a. (C) Modernization of the IIGF Logistical System

(1) The IIGF is fully aware of the need to modernize its logistical system to be responsive to the new sales environment. Numerous steps have been taken by the IIGF during the past two years, with the advice and assistance of the Advisory Group, to improve the logistical system.

(2) A Deputy CG for Logistics has been added to the IIGF staff. This individual is responsible for establishing logistical policy and relieves the CG, IIGF of many day-to-day decisions in the logistical area.

(3) In August 1968 an Ammunition Command was formed and assumed responsibility for receiving, storing, maintaining, and issuing all Class V stocks in the IIGF inventory, as well as training all assigned personnel. In addition, the Ammunition Command provides storage facilities to the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) and the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) as required. Having a single individual in charge of all ammunition has led to a considerable improvement in the ammunition area.

(4) Action to mechanize the IIGF supply system has been initiated.

(5) Action to reorganize the entire IIGF logistical system has been initiated.

(6) Action to establish a depot maintenance capability for the future has been initiated.

b. (U) The Present Logistical Organization in the IIGF

The current organization is technical service oriented. This results in considerable duplication of supply and maintenance functions and does not permit a flexible and efficient response to current logistical problems within the rapidly expanding and modernizing IIGF. The logistical concept currently envisaged by the IIGF calls for a functionalized supply and maintenance system. To achieve this goal a need exists to automate the supply and maintenance system and reorganize the logistical structure. Positive steps have been taken by the IIGF in both areas.

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### **c. (U) Automation of IIGF Supply System**

(1) Through the use of MAP funds, the services of DAC Systems Analysts were obtained for five months during 1968 and again for the period November 1969 - May 1970 to assist and advise the IIGF. The IIGF has designated a manager for ADP operations and has taken the initial steps towards establishing ADP in logistical operations. Personnel needed are being recruited and trained and this program has received the enthusiastic support of the CG, IIGF. The first step will be to develop an ADP capability within the Ordnance Department, which will take approximately two years. The Ordnance Department was selected to initiate the pilot program because it is responsible for approximately 65% of the line items in the IIGF inventory. When the ADP system within the Ordnance Department becomes operational the remaining technical services can be automated which will lead to the eventual functionalization of the IIGF logistical system.

(2) The IIGF recently signed a sales case for the services of two contract Systems Analysts. These analysts will be able to carry on the work started by the MAP provided DACs in the automation of the IIGF supply system. Another noteworthy accomplishment, and perhaps the most important, was that in January 1970 the CG, IIGF gave complete responsibility for all EAM and ADP operations to the Chief, ADP Center. Prior to this time there was no clearly defined line of responsibility for ADP operations within the IIGF.

(3) The ADP Center has begun preliminary work on programming an automated supply system. However, much work needs to be accomplished and the development of a fully automated system will be a long process.

(4) The Chief, ADP Center has begun conferences with the Ministry of Education to start an in-country training program for programmers. As an interim measure to upgrade the knowledge of the programmers, the DAC Systems Analyst conducted a course in programming for the members of the IIGF ADP Center. This training, along with the technical liberty which is in the process of being established, will be a great help to the operators, programmers, and managers in expanding their working knowledge and abilities in the ADP field. Additionally, IBM, Iran has agreed to advise IIGF of their trained personnel that are drafted into the army. IIGF could then ensure these people were placed in the ADP area.

### **d. (C) Logistical Reorganization**

The IIGF has developed both a short-range and long-range plan for the logistical support of its tactical forces. The short-range plan will provide the needed improvements in the Field Army Logistical structure by the addition of required logistical units and a restructuring of the logistical control elements. The long-range plan will provide for a functional logistical system with necessary disposal of depots and is dependent upon the development of an ADP capability and the use of a better communication system in Iran, which is currently programmed.

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### e. (U) Research and Evaluation Within the IIGF

In 1969 the staff responsibility for the Combat Research and Evaluation Center (CREC) was transferred from the Supreme Commander's Staff to the IIGF. At that time CREC had on hand less than one-third of its authorized strength of project officers. Since that time CREC has been brought up to authorized strength. As a result of support by the CG, IIGF, a program is now being developed to begin in-country training courses for CREC project officers to increase their knowledge of R&D techniques and procedures. Prior to this time project officers were assigned to CREC from other IIGF units and had no training in the R&D field.

### f. (C) Technical Service Departments and Commands

#### (1) Ammunition Command

(a) War Reserve Ammunition (WRA): WRA was originally provided to IIGF under MAP, based on rates provided by USSTRICOM directives. Initial FMS purchases were based on these same rates. During June and July 1969, the IIGF recomputed its WRA requirements and arrived at quantities considered excessive by US advisors. Authority was obtained from USSTRICOM in December 1969 to provide IIGF with the rates utilized by US forces as contained in the United States Army SB 38-26. These US rates are being modified by the IIGF based on local tactical considerations and organizational differences between US and IIGF forces. When completed this will be the basis for establishing new and more realistic WRA levels.

(b) Ammunition Surveillance: The ammunition surveillance program has shown continued progress through emphasis by the IIGF Ammunition Command Chief of Surveillance. Additional personnel continue to be trained in CONUS and on the job in all phases of ammunition which include surveillance, care and preservation, storage and transportation. The utilization of translated TMs and FMs has been a definite asset to the ammunition surveillance program. Administrative records continue to be refined. The receipt and distribution of suspended and released from suspension notices for ammunition are accurate and timely. With the receipt of additional ammunition peculiar equipment and the continued command interest and emphasis being placed on this program, additional improvements will occur.

(c) Ammunition Renovation: Renovation of some items of ammunition is currently being accomplished at ammunition depots in Ghom and Khorramabad. Though still in its infancy, ammunition renovation within the IIGF is becoming a reality. Training of officers and NCOs in the United States is providing a nucleus of knowledgeable personnel on which to base continued growth in this vital program. Construction of ammunition renovation facilities at Ghom and Khorramabad Depots was begun during the summer of 1969 and will be completed by July 1970. Ammunition peculiar equipment placed on order in February 1968 is now arriving in-country. Approximately seventy percent of the line items are now located at the depots. Ammunition renovation component parts are continuing to arrive and approximately fifty-five percent of the line items

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for the initial FMS Case are now located at the depots. During the latter part of 1970 a renovation capability comparable to that in US depots should be in existence.

(d) Ammunition Storage Facilities: The ammunition storage facilities construction program is progressing satisfactorily and is approximately eighty percent completed. This program involves the construction of 119 ammunition igloos with a total storage capacity of 25,140 tons.

(e) In-country Production of Ammunition: The following items are presently produced in-country:

7.62 mm ball  
.30 cal ball M-1  
.45 cal ball  
.50 cal ball  
60 mm HE  
81 mm HE  
105 mm HE (Howitzer)  
Grenade, practice

### **(2) Medical Department**

For several years the Medical Advisory Division has recommended increased program coordination and cooperation among the medical departments of the three forces, the Medical Director's Office, SCS, and even between the armies and the Surgeon's Office of Hq IIGF. Three completely independent medical departments involved in individual service administrative programs including medical planning, training, supply, personnel, etc., have tied up more military medical personnel in administrative tasks than the IIA can afford. Progress toward increased cooperation has been achieved in the following areas:

(a) Plans for new medical construction by the three forces are now coordinated by the Medical Director, SCS.

(b) There is some cross-servicing now of specialized personnel and equipment.

(c) The IIGF Medical Depot is now supplying all three forces.

(d) The new 270-bed dependent hospital is open to the three forces rather than IIGF only.

(e) A new 500-bed hospital planned for Tehran will be a tri-service facility.

It is hoped that progress can continue in this area so that as many of the medical personnel as possible can move from administrative tasks back into areas of patient care.

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### **(3) Transportation Command**

Modern busses have been procured and are utilized to support "domicile-to-duty" passenger requirements thus freeing TO&E series vehicles for training. This reduces operating costs and frees tactical vehicles for their intended use. Several types of commercial trucks are under test and if adopted by the IIGF will replace the remaining tactical type vehicles which are currently engaged in administrative local hauls. In addition, commercial contracts have been negotiated to reduce the requirement for using tactical vehicles for administrative line haul.

### **(4) Engineer Department**

(a) During the last two years the IIGF Engineer Department has completed or is in the process of completing \$23,000,000 worth of construction for the IIGF. The Plan Organization provides program guidance, in the form of a five year plan, to the IIGF Engineer Department. Funds are provided in the Engineer Department annually by the Plan Organization and priorities for construction are established in the fourth quarter of the current year for the following year's construction. The IIGF Engineer Department has developed a competent design capability and has hired a number of civilian engineers in its operation.

(b) The site for the new Engineer Training Center has been selected in the vicinity of Borujerd, just north of Khorramabad, and ground has been broken for construction. The first phase of the construction program involves the initial administration buildings, classrooms, billets, and training areas which should be completed in the year 1971. The additional training and administrative facilities will be constructed as money becomes available. The move of the Engineer Training Center has been programmed for June 1971.

### **(5) Quartermaster Department**

This department has taken positive steps over the past two years to improve combat service support to the IIGF units. The Israeli Field Kitchen was field tested, accepted as a standard item of issue, and to date approximately 1,000 have been issued to company size units. A Yugoslavian Mobile Field Bakery and a United States Mobile Bath Unit have been field tested and final reports are being prepared. The Quartermaster Department has initiated action to procure cold weather clothing and better field equipment as well as provided tentage to IIGF units for field use.

### **(6) Signal Department**

Three qualified US signal technicians were hired under FMS Case UGE in 1969. As a result of their efforts, detailed plans have been developed which will greatly assist the IIGF in modernizing and upgrading the Signal Training Center, improving the IIGF Signal Repair and Maintenance Facilities, and assuring the development of an IIGF Mobile tactical communications capability that will interface with the proposed Integrated Tele-Communications System (INTS).

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(7) Ordnance Department

(a) A program was established in conjunction with the Army Material Command which resulted in the identification and return to stock of over 1.5 million dollars of MAP provided tools and test equipment. This program resulted in a 3.5 million dollar sales case for additional tools and test equipment.

(b) The Ordnance Department has established programs which have greatly enhanced the end item utilization of MAP provided equipment. The M-47 tank program mentioned below is a major effort. Quad 50 cal MG Mounts M 45C are being mounted on 2 1/2 ton Reo Trucks and Leyland (Iranian) manufactured trucks and tests of each configuration are being conducted. A program has been initiated to recondition as many as possible of the M3 105 MM Howitzers presently on hand for use by reserve units. The 60 MM mortars on hand in depots will be issued to IIGF reserve units as well as M-1 rifles and M19A1 machine guns as they are replaced in active duty units by the new family of weapons. Additionally, tests are being conducted to utilize the M4 chassis as carriers for 120 MM Israeli mortars. This would provide the capability to displace forward and provide continuous fire support. M4, 105 MM assault gun tanks have also been rehabilitated and issued to the troops manning positions in the Abadan area.

g(C)Miscellaneous Activities

(1) M-47 Retrofit Program and Development of a Depot Maintenance Capability: After three years or more of discussions the Government of Iran negotiated a contract with a US firm for the modernization of its fleet of M-47 tanks. The contract with Bowen-McLaughlin-York Company (BMY) will provide for the construction of a modern repair facility which will be able to handle the future depot rebuild of all IIGF equipment. The contract also provides for the training of the Iranian personnel that will be employed at the repair facility. This pool of qualified personnel will provide the IIGF with the technical knowhow required for follow-on rebuild and/or production projects.

(2) Movements Control: The Transportation Branch, G-4 Division, IIGF has completed final planning and is currently gathering statistical data for the activation of an IIA Joint Movements Control Office (JMCO). This office, in addition to performing control functions for the Ground Forces, will act as a single manager for the Chief, SCS in planning and coordinating movements of troops, equipment and supplies of one service utilizing the transportation assets of another service. IIGF will staff the JMCO; however, personnel of the other services will assist JMCO on an "ad hoc" basis in moves involving joint forces.

h(C)Third Country Equipment

The introduction of third country equipment into the IIGF inventory continues to cause supply and maintenance problems. Equipment from third countries

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arrives without adequate training of personnel, lack of manuals and maintenance tools and equipment. The IIGF should develop maintenance and supply support plans prior to introducing any new items into its system.

**i(C)In-Country Vehicle Production**

During 1969 the Government of Iran developed the capability to produce both 24-volt jeeps, jeep ambulances, and 106 jeeps. Approximately 432 jeeps are scheduled for production in 1970.

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**SECTION II - CONTINUING PROJECTS (C)**

This section outlines those areas where continuing emphasis is mandatory. IIGF has recognized the problems outlined and has made attempts to solve them. However, I feel our advice and assistance are still required in these areas in the future. This section highlights the most important of the ongoing programs reported in the Monthly Information Letter.

**SECTION IIA - PERSONNEL (C)**

a. Improving Quality of Regular NCO Corps

(1) In order to attract additional and better qualified personnel the IIGF through the encouragement of ARSEC has developed and received approval of a limited incentive pay awards program covering certain hard skill career fields. Additionally, approval was received to employ a limited number of HOMAFARS (High School Graduate Conscripts) for a 5-year period - paid special salaries - and trained in CONUS in Electronics Communications. These HOMAFARS will be used in the in-country Signal School to upgrade instruction.

(2) ARSEC must continually urge and assist the IIGF in obtaining approval to expand the Incentive Pay Awards Programs and the hiring of HOMAFARS to cover additional hard skill technical and administrative career fields. Additionally, ARSEC should urge CG, IIGF, to request a change in the law which, at present, will not allow a conscript NCO to enlist in the Regular Corps until he has completed his entire two years of conscription. If the law were changed to allow conscripts to enlist in the RA at any time after his initial five months training and be offered some type of incentive such as an enlistment bonus the IIGF would then have the capability of an in-service recruitment program for high school graduates not now available.

(3) The CG, IIGF, has initiated his own NCO modernization program, eliminating some NCOs and arranging for higher pay for the remainder.

b. MOS Classification and Reporting Procedures

(1) The IIGF has become convinced of the necessity for proper classification and utilization of personnel by MOS and skill level for the purpose of establishing a firm basis for fulfilling requirements, establishing training and school quotas and a viable reserve system for use in mobilization. Through the publication of MOS manuals, development of psychometric testing, distribution of reserve and mobilization manual, improved requisitioning procedures, and personnel management teams the IIGF is well on its way to effective Personnel Management.

(2) To ensure that effective control of personnel throughout IIGF continues, ARSEC must continually press ground forces to closely monitor the reports of its

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Field Personnel Management Teams, institute a personnel management team at IIGF level and take rigorous action to correct malassignments and utilizations. Additionally, ARSEC must emphasize the importance of IIGF insisting on accurate and timely personnel readiness reporting by subordinate units. At present though a system has been set up it will take quite awhile to make it work effectively.

### **c. Career Officer Program**

(1) The IIGF has been encouraged to establish a Career Development Program heretofore nonexistent except in barely recognizable inchoate form. During the past several months copies of DA Pamphlet 600-3 "Officer Career Planning" have been furnished the IIGF and ARSEC has assisted in preparation of a parallel document for the IIGF.

(2) It is now necessary for ARSEC to continually emphasize the importance of a career program in order to allow IIA officers to have a sense of purpose and direction and allow IIGF the ability to ensure that only the most qualified officers continue to progress and those with limited abilities are identified prior to progression past their capabilities and are eliminated.

### **d. ROTC Program (Iran)**

(1) An enthusiastic ROTC program has been established at most Universities throughout Iran. At the present time there are approximately 3,000 students in their senior year, 6,000 in the 2d year, 8,000 in the 3d year and 10,000 in the 1st year. To ensure the IIGF receives a proportionate share of graduates each year, starting in the fall of 1970, ARSEC has continually urged the CG, IIGF, to cause position surveys to be instituted to determine the number of ROTC graduates that can be effectively utilized within Ground Force Units to validate requests for assignment. Although these surveys have been started, to date no requirements have been submitted to higher headquarters.

(2) This important program will require close and continuous follow-up action on the part of ARSEC to ensure the IIGF takes full advantage of this source of officer procurement. Although this program is not a cure-all in solving the critical shortages of RA officers it will act as a short range solution until additional sources of procurement of RA officers can be established, and even more important give the IIGF a source of officers to man their projected reserve units and to act as combat replacements.

### **e. Utilization of Conscript Officers**

(1) Until recently the IIGF has been reluctant to utilize conscript officers in other than minor administrative positions. Through the urging of ARSEC the IIGF has begun a limited program of assigning conscript officers in positions normally occupied by regular officers but not requiring command responsibilities. This has resulted in the IIGF being able to reassign some of its RA officers to career pattern positions in Combat and Combar Support Units.

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(2) ARSEC should continue to stress the value of utilizing conscript officers to the fullest extent in order to better utilize RA officers in career type assignments.

f. 3D Lieutenant Program

(1) ARSEC recommended the establishment of a Junior Officer School to supplement the output of the IIMA in order to alleviate major shortages now being experienced within the IIGF. This recommendation was not approved although similar programs are in effect for the other services.

(2) It was recently learned that the IIAC and IIG have been authorized and have established Junior Officer Programs in specific technical (specialist) areas. Because of the serious shortages that continue to exist in the IIGF and the fact that the IIMA is incapable of producing sufficient numbers of RA officers to offset this problem especially as it affects the middle ranks, ARSEC should continue to urge the IIGF to revive its efforts with HIM to gain approval for the establishment of this program even though on a piece meal basis, i.e., ADA first, etc.

g. Civilian Hire

(1) Formerly the IIGF hired female civilians only for positions as medical technicians and secretaries at the highest staff levels. However, during the past year the IIGF has received permission to hire female personnel to fill selected administrative positions. Through this program many NCOs are being released for utilization in supervisor and field positions.

(2) ARSEC must continue to emphasize this program to the IIGF and assist in identifying more positions that can be accomplished by both male and female civilians. As more civilians are hired larger numbers of NCOs can be effectively utilized in combat and combat support type units and as assistant instructors at Training Centers and Schools.

h. Reserve Mobilization Program

(1) Because of recent border incidents and related international tensions ARSEC has worked with the IIGF in developing and publishing a Reserve and Mobilization Manual. The reserve and mobilization concept for the IIGF closely parallels that of the U.S. It includes reserve units, individual mobilization designees, control groups and obligatory active reserve tours for six month active trainees. Each Territorial Commander in coordination with Army Commanders have call-up authority, control responsibility for their areas, training of units and individuals and for mobilization as directed by His Imperial Majesty. This program was effected in December 1969.

(2) Recently the CG, IIGF has indicated that his immediate priority was the rapid improvement of his active Army and its ability to mobilize and integrate its noncombat units into combat units in times of emergency. He feels that

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although it is "nice" to have a plan for a reserve force he was not prepared at present to fully implement the program. His reasoning was that experience has taught that for the foreseeable future any armed conflict in this part of the world will be of short duration. Although his reasoning is sound, ARSEC must continue to emphasize the need to keep the Reserve and Mobilization Program (even limited) functioning since experience also shows that limited hit and run conflicts can last for an undetermined period of time and will drain manpower just the same as an all out war. Further, the need for reserve units to take over responsibilities of deployed regular units to allow them to concentrate in threatened areas is most important.

### **IIGF Reorganization Planning**

(1) Considerable advisory effort has been expanded on this subject over the last several years. The coordination of the advisory effort in this area has been directed primarily by the G-2/3 Advisor. In the personnel area continual emphasis has been placed on establishing systematic procedures for determining personnel asset capability versus the various force structure plans developed. Numerous changes in the desired force structure coupled with simultaneous changes in all TOEs and TDs has made fruitful efforts in this area extremely difficult. In spite of these obstacles serious attempts have been made by the IIGF G-1 to compare total requirements to assets on hand by grade and MOS. Currently, emphasis is being placed on refining this comparison of assets vis-a-vis requirements to identify category of personnel, i.e., Regular Army (long term) and Conscripts (short term) and by civilian education level for NCOs, i.e., 9th grade graduates and below vs high school graduates and above. The main thrust throughout has been to:

- (a) Determine requirements in sufficient detail to allow for maximum planning flexibility;
- (b) Inventory assets on hand in the same detail as the requirements;
- (c) Compare assets to requirements; and
- (d) Prepare realistic future plans.

(2) Future efforts will be required in encouraging the refinement processing of both assets and requirements by category (RA vs Conscript) and civilian education level for NCOs. If the force is to expand and modernize as planned, at the same time civilian industry is doing the same, the IIGF must be capable of stating its requirements to the GOI and enjoin them to enact legislation allowing the IIA to receive the personnel needed from the currently limited trainable manpower base of Iran. Continued emphasis must be placed on full and detailed planning before reaching conclusion thereby limiting the possibility of over commitment. Until such time as the general educational level of Iran makes a qualitative jump, problems will be experienced in obtaining suitable trainable manpower for the IIGF and must be given the fullest consideration during reorganization planning.

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j. English Language Expansion Program

(1) ARSEC recommended that English Language Training be included in the existing POIs at the branch schools, the combat arms schools and centers, the IIA Aviation Battalion, the II Military Academy and the C&GSC. Additionally, it was recommended that IIGF ELS be expanded to accommodate approximately 600 students per year. This general concept was approved by CG, IIGF in July 1968. It was determined that equipment and materials needed would be divided into two separate sales cases. The first one-third of Case UGR is in-country. The remaining two-thirds is expected by September 1970.

(2) The first phase of the expansion program is behind schedule due to nonreceipt of FMS equipment and materials programmed for delivery during the 1st Qtr FY 70. However, the first phase should be completed by 1 October 1970. ARSEC should continue to monitor this important program. Additionally, a new Letter of Intent for the 2nd Phase equipment purchase must be obtained if the English Language Training is to be initiated at the Combat Arms and Technical Training Centers as planned. The conduct of existing programs and the 2nd Phase expansion plan should continue to receive maximum advisory effort.

**SECTION IIB - PLANS, TRAINING & INTELLIGENCE (C)**

a. IIGF Reorganization

(1) ARSEC has appointed a number of committees tasked with the development of a Force Plan. The latest was formed on 5 January 1970. This committee is developing a unilateral Force Plan with a 6+ division force goal. This plan when developed should be presented as a guide or model to the IIGF and CG, IIGF should be encouraged to develop his own. It is felt that this is a means to make the IIGF aware of the details of future planning requirements and ultimately to have them adopt such a practice themselves.

(2) A long range objective should be to also develop a Strategic Objectives Plan. Additionally, IIGF should think of completing a Mobilization Plan as well.

(3) Changes in organization and force structure will no doubt continue to occur with the same frequency in the future. In the area of force planning, however, if a plan is developed, these can be treated as modifications to the basic plan rather than a completely new concept.

(4) The activities of the IIGF, ACSFOR, particularly in the area of TOEs, logistical unit development, force development and additional unit and equipment requirements should be closely monitored. It is only through the continued use of this staff section by CG, IIGF that he can ultimately plan on a programmed basis the modernization and development of the IIGF.

b. Schools and Replacement Training Centers

(1) In response to the emphasis on the training base the following actions are incomplete:

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(a) The CG, IIGF has requested a full-time advisor (and staff as necessary) for each school and replacement training center. In response, an Army Section study provided full-time advisors for the Infantry Training Centers and Signal Training Center in addition to those already assigned for the Armor, Artillery, Aviation and English Language Training Centers. A full-time advisor has also been assigned for the C&GSC. It was felt that additional full-time advisors are not within the capabilities of the Advisory Group at this time and alternate solutions have been recommended.

(b) ARMISH/MAAG is giving further consideration to the assignment of a full-time advisor for the Military Academy and has directed the assignment of additional part-time advisors so that no advisor will have more than one training facility. As an interim measure the J-staff has been given part-time advisory responsibility for the IIMA.

(c) Further actions need to be held in abeyance for reevaluation after IIGF initiates corrective actions on current major problem areas which cannot be alleviated by assignment of additional US Advisors. If the IIGF does not place a high priority on their schools, no matter how many US instructor/advisors are provided to the school, they will be unable to attain desired standards.

(2) Quarterly school advisor reports should be edited by Army Section and appropriate information brought to the attention of CG, IIGF.

(3) Follow-up is required to ensure that DCSIT, IIGF publishes a new training directive, school loading plan, school catalogue and training ammunition allocation plan to support 1970-71 training year requirements.

(4) Follow-up is required to appoint officers when available to make comprehensive surveys of those schools not yet covered.

(5) Follow-up is required on IIGF planning, pre-construction of required facilities and move of schools (Hqs, Support Training Center and six schools to Tabriz and the Engineer and Signal Schools elsewhere from present locations).

(6) Follow-up is required on alternate suggestions for additional CONUS training of personnel for service schools in lieu of additional school advisors and additional on-the-job training of students in CONUS prior to their return to Iran for instructor assignments.

(7) Additional emphasis and follow-up is required to ensure action is initiated by IIGF to procure training aids, training films, non-TD equipment required for training at service schools and training publications all in critically short supply with no provisions or channels at present for their procurement.

c. Master Objective Plan (MOP)

IIGF has realized the effectiveness in which the MOP can be used as a management tool. The present difficulties with the MOP were discussed in the introductory

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remarks and again in Section I. The primary emphasis should now be placed by ARSEC on developing a new set of MOPs at IIGF level.

d. Intelligence

(1) In the field of intelligence the major areas requiring continuous emphasis are: (1) the organization and training of a MI Bn, (2) the training and assignment of G-2/S-2 air officers to combat units, and (3) the preparation and maintaining of Order of Battle information on objective countries.

(2) In addition to the required emphasis in the above three areas the tasks will be beyond the capability of ARSEC as of 30 June 1970 as the position of G-2 advisor has been deleted. These projects must be assumed by J-2 ARMISH/MAAG.

e. Aviation

(1) The Jet Ranger helicopter being delivered to GOI is powered with the Allison C-18 engine which is rated at 317 SHP for take-off. Statistics indicate that this helicopter will have marginal lift capability when the weight of a weapon system is added and normal operating altitudes and temperature in Iran are computed. Recommendations have been made for GOI to purchase a water/alcohol system for the engine which will increase the rated shaft horsepower or to obtain the new C-20 engine when it becomes available in 1971.

(2) Draft aviation TOEs to IIGF in early 1969. To date, these TOEs have not been published or implemented. Aviation support for the IIGF, based on concepts developed by the US Army, will never be available until firm TOEs for the new helicopter units are developed and published.

(3) The GOI is considering the purchase of CH-47C helicopters from the Agusta-Bell Corporation of Milan, Italy. Present indications are that upwards of 19 helicopters will be ordered for the IIGF and 3 for the IIAF. The delivery schedule for these helicopters is flexible and will be more dependent upon availability of pilots and technicians than on production capability. Subject to such consideration, delivery of IIGF helicopters may be expected starting October 1972. The GOI does not yet have a training plan for pilots and technicians to man these helicopters. ARMISH/MAAG has been requested to assist in developing a coordinated program. Due to the complexity of the CH-47 type helicopter, ARSEC has recommended that all pilots and technicians be trained in the US.

(4) IIGF aviation has requested 125 personnel for training as mechanic/technicians for the Bell Jet Ranger program. This number is insufficient to properly staff the new aviation and maintenance units. In order to fill just the proposed maintenance unit the TOEs call for over 600 mechanic/technicians, of which approximately one-half are on hand or have been allocated. Failure to train these personnel will probably have little effect on the operation of the helicopters units in the first year; however, as engine time is accumulated on the helicopters, field maintenance requirements become greater and if trained

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personnel are not available the combat readiness of the aviation units will be seriously affected. Action must be taken by IIGF now to start training sufficient additional mechanic/technicians to fill all long-term aviation maintenance requirements.

(5) All indications presently point to a slow but, eventually successful, aviation program for the IIGF. However, the continued insistence of the IIGF to maintain an IIAF officer in charge of its aviation program will doubtless result in a loss of esprit de corps among Army aviation personnel and may eventually seriously retard the overall aviation program.

f. Airborne

(1) During my tour, I have repeatedly attempted to get the IIGF and IIAF to conduct joint planning for airborne operations. To reinforce my position, I have attempted to arrange for selected officers to attend some of our airborne exercises. We were successful in getting three IIGF and two IIAF officers to observe DAWN PATROL - 70 in Verona, Italy. This met with so much success that I have urged repeatedly that they attend further exercises as observers (OJT). This has not been successful. I feel the need must be met if we are to have a true airborne capability and strongly urge that further action be taken to send appropriate Iranian officers to view one of our airborne exercises in order that they can appreciate the critical need for joint planning.

(2) A mobile training team will conduct training during October 1970 for the personnel in the Airborne Brigade Aerial Delivery Company on heavy equipment drop procedures.

g. Signal

All of the areas previously pointed out in Section I are still in the on-going-projects category since there is a tremendous amount of work required by the IIGF before their accomplishments will be assimilated into their system.

h. Artillery (ADA & Field)

(1) Availability of personnel, funds, and priorities will permit follow-up on plan to purchase Air Defense Battalion radars of the AN/GSS-1 type for divisional air defense units (1 per battalion). Lack of early warning capability places divisional units at a disadvantage to properly perform the air defense mission. Air force early warning although also necessary does not meet the local warning requirements for divisional units. The mobility of divisional air defense units makes dependence on Air Force early warning impractical. The problem compounds normal communications difficulties, due to required mobility of the air defense units, with the Air Force radar sites.

(2) Additional emphasis on air defense training is needed. The lack of training by air defense units when located at operational sites has a degrading effect on the unit's ability to perform its mission. Provisions must be

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made to provide stand down time from operational duties on a rotation basis to provide training time.

(3) The ever increasing air defense force will require greater staff planning at the Hq, IIGF level. To this end stress must be placed on the organization of an air defense section in G-3 and/or force development organization. An ARSEC fact sheet on this subject was approved in concept by CG, IIGF, however, lack of qualified personnel has not permitted the establishment of the section.

(4) The artillery study prepared by ARSEC and apparently approved by CG, IIGF will require follow-up to develop the short-range goals;

(a) Formation of one 8" How Battalion as a training vehicle for further expansion.

(b) Activation as personnel and funds permit of the seven (7) Bn Arty Force for the IIGF two (2) division study force.

(c) Activation and implementation of a reserve program to create the nondivisional artillery needed.

(d) A program to develop acquisition capability at all levels from Bn through Army

**SECTION II C - LOGISTICS (C)**

a. Reorganization of the IIGF Logistical System

The IIGF recognizes the need to develop a functionalized logistical system. Progress will be dependent upon the mechanization of the existing technical service department supply systems and improved communications. A short-range (2 years) and a long-range (5 years) concept has been developed and approved by the CG, IIGF and the Chief, SCS. Detailed plans must now be developed to implement the short and long range concepts in order to ensure a smooth and orderly transition based on availability of funds, personnel, facilities and equipment.

b. Automation of the IIGF Logistical System

(1) Tied in closely with the reorganization of the IIGF logistical system is the requirement to develop an ADP capability. The manual logistical system currently employed by IIGF cannot effectively provide the necessary logistical support and management controls required by a modern, sophisticated ground force. Progress has been slow in developing the necessary organization and providing trained personnel to meet this requirement. A Chief of ADP Operations has been designated by CG, IIGF. Two DAC Systems Analysts, funded under MAP, have been assigned, one during 1968 and another during 1969-70 to assist the IIGF in developing plans and procedures to mechanize the supply system. A contract has been signed by IIGF to obtain the services of two US systems analysts

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for a period of one year who will continue to advise and assist the IIGF in this critical area. It appears that the necessary ground work is being laid to establish an effective machine oriented supply system.

(2) ARSEC will be required to provide advice and assistance in this area for several years in order to ensure that:

(a) The required personnel receive adequate training both in-country and in CONUS.

(b) The necessary regulations and directives required to implement an automated supply system are written and distributed.

(c) A comprehensive PSN cataloging system is developed by each technical service.

(d) The transition from a manual to an automated supply system occurs in an orderly and timely manner without interruption of logistical support.

c. War Reserve Ammunition (WRA)

(1) Continuing advisory effort is required on the computation of WRA quantities in order to provide IIGF a balanced war reserve stockage for combat support of the IIGF and ensure that adequate storage facilities are programmed as required to accommodate the ammunition stocks.

(2) Future emphasis will be placed on timely updating of required quantities based on changes in the force structures and the requirement for special or project stocks to support the various contingency plans. Construction requirements for additional storage facilities will be developed concurrently.

d. Ammunition Surveillance

The Khorramabad Ammunition Storage Depot does not have sufficient surveillance personnel to conduct an adequate surveillance program. Plans have been initiated by the IIGF Ammunition Command to employ and train personnel in surveillance at Khorramabad Ammunition Storage Depot in the near future.

e. Ammunition Renovation

(1) Several years ago it was realized that some of the ammunition in the IIGF inventory had become unserviceable due to long periods of storage under undesirable conditions. At that time, action was initiated at two ammunition depots to begin some minor cleaning, repairing, and repainting of selected ammunition items. IIGF recognized that they did not possess the capability to do actual renovation. With the assistance of US Advisors, plans were initiated for the construction of facilities and the purchase of necessary equipment and ammunition components to give the IIGF an ammunition renovation capability.

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(2) At the present time there are appreciable quantities of unserviceable, repairable ammunition in the IIGF inventory. The next step in acquiring a safe and efficient ammunition renovation capability is to train the personnel required to do the work. It is planned to hire a civilian workforce at the ammunition depots for line operations. It is therefore imperative that a training program be established utilizing US trained Iranian personnel to instruct this workforce in all phases of ammunition renovation. At the present time adequate training of Iranian personnel is the key to the future of the ammunition Renovation Program in the IIGF. Another area which requires continued emphasis is in planning, programming, and reporting. These are necessary control measures which will require continued emphasis by IIGF in the years ahead.

f. M-47 Tank Retrofit Program

(1) The purpose of this program is to increase the armored combat capability of the IIGF by modernizing the existing M-47 tanks in Iran. Finalization of the contract proposals for the construction and operation of the retrofit facility has been completed. A suitable plant site has been selected in the Masjed-e-Soleyman area, the administrative and operational complex of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). NIOC is phasing out of this area into another (Ahwaz) area and will be able to turn over much of this area to the military or other such agency of the GOI. Since many facilities, such as administrative, hospital, storage, school, housing, commissary, operational and maintenance buildings are already available the GOI can realize a large monetary savings (about \$15 million) as well as accelerate the retrofit program. In addition, a source of skilled labor is considered more readily available in the MIS area and less hiring and training problems are envisioned. Key factors that have been considered in the final selection of the plant site were the availability of water, power, and labor as well as the load-bearing capability of the soil.

(2) As part of the M-47 tank retrofit program, future emphasis will be placed on expanding the facility to include rebuild capability of all IIGF equipment. Consideration is also being given to eventually provide for the production of combat vehicles as well.

g. Disposal of MAP Property

The problem of disposing of excess and/or obsolete MAP provided property can be divided into two distinct areas; obtaining disposition instructions from US disposal activities by ARSEC and the establishment of an adequate IIGF Property Disposal System.

(1) ARSEC Property Disposal Activities: Under present procedures IIGF submits a listing of excess and/or obsolete MAP material to G-4 Division, ARSEC. A US advisor must then inspect these items to verify the FSN, nomenclature, cost and condition code. After this verification is completed a list of all serviceable and repairable unserviceable material with a line item value in excess of \$50 is forwarded to USSTRICOM for disposition instructions. If the material is not

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required by the US, it is classed by USSTRICOM as disposable property. All disposable property with a dollar value of \$50 or more is then reported to TUSLOG for final disposition instructions. These procedures require the expenditure of a considerable number of man hours. With the steady reduction of ARMISS/MAAG personnel the shift to a sales program and the ever increasing amount of MAP material requiring disposal action obtaining disposition instructions is rapidly becoming an impossible task. A request for exception to US disposal procedures has been forwarded to USSTRICOM. USSTRICOM has expressed sympathy with our position and is attempting to simplify procedures which will reduce the administrative requirements for obtaining disposition instructions from the USG. In view of the fact that Iran is now purchasing her material from us it seems logical that a new approach be developed.

(2) Property Disposal System: The IIGF has a decentralized disposal system, i.e., each technical service department and supply depot is responsible for the disposal of excess, obsolete and salvage property. In actuality a property disposal system does not exist as the material is held by the depot until it is decided that sufficient quantity has accumulated to warrant a sale. At that time a commission is formed to handle the sale. Consequently, there are few qualified personnel experienced in property disposal within the IIGF. The result has been an accumulation of large quantities of disposable property that is not being sold and thus is presenting a significant storage problem. Property disposal data has been requested from USSTRICOM to assist in convincing the IIGF of the need to modernize their property disposal system. The planned reorganization of the IIGF logistical system will provide for centralized control of the property disposal function.

**h. Transportation Management**

(1) Continuous efforts have been exerted to convey to the IIGF an appreciation for sound traffic management procedures. There is need to establish a transportation system which is responsive to national emergencies, provides required services at the lowest possible cost, makes maximum use of available manpower and equipment and reduces the volume of supplies in the pipeline to a minimum.

(2) These objectives can be accomplished by sending selected IIGF personnel to CONUS to attend courses in traffic management/movement control followed by a period of OJT; provide an orientation tour for CG, Transportation Command and Chief, Joint Movement Control to CONUS; and establish a Movements Specialist Course at the IIGF Transportation Center. A requirement also exists to develop doctrine and procedures and publish appropriate regulations and TMs. Efforts should be made to establish the Field Army Movement Control Teams as active traffic management organizations and include them as part of the Joint Movement Control Office (JMCO) technical channel. Eventually the entire transportation service could then be separated from the control of the Field Army and an area transportation system established. These actions must be time-phased with the general reorganization of the IIGF logistical system in order to provide a modern, functionalized, and responsive transportation system.

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i. Combat Research and Evaluation Center (CREC)

(1) The IIGF obtains its military equipment from a wide variety of sources and countries, thereby making its equipment inventory unique from the viewpoint of maintenance, compatibility, and capabilities. An effective organization capable of studying all facets of military hardware is vitally needed within the IIGF. Only within the past six months has the Combat Research and Evaluation Center shown any indications that it could perform this mission. Continued emphasis must be placed on training its personnel in R&D techniques and procedures. The development of R&D programs meaningful and beneficial to the IIGF, and obtaining needed technical assistance from outside sources such as Arya Mehr University and the Industrial Management Institute.

(2) The Research Triangle Institute, under contract to Army Research Projects Agency presently has three analysts assisting CREC in its efforts. Close coordination must be continued with these analysts in order to ensure positive results from CREC, and a development of future capabilities for actual research from this organization.

j. Field Medical Service

(1) At the present time the IIGF does not possess a divisional field medical capability. Fixed regional hospitals are located throughout Iran. These hospitals lack sufficient beds to support the IIGF under combat conditions. Necessitating the development of a mobilization plan based on utilization of civilian hospitals. We have recommended the purchase of Mobile Surgical and Evacuation Hospitals. The exact number will depend on the contingency plans developed by the IIGF.

(2) A recommendation has been presented to IIGF that under the planned IIGF Logistical Reorganization the Army Surgeon's Office be reorganized and his position be established as a Deputy to the Support Command Commander. It was also recommended that the Surgeon serve as medical staff advisor to the Army Commander.

k. Medical Service Corps (MSC)

A large number of physicians are tied up to SCS and IIGF Headquarters and in the hospitals performing strictly administrative tasks. These tasks could be performed by officers with a knowledge of the IIGF medical organization. To use physicians in these jobs is a gross waste of talent. It has been recommended that a small number of officers be commissioned each year as MSCs and as many of these officers as possible be sent to CONUS to attend the basic MSC course. These personnel could form a teaching cadre in Iran to train additional MSC officers.

l. Centralized Medical Control

(1) The IIGF Surgeon currently has no control over the nondivisional medical resources within the field army areas which has created the following problems:

(a) Some IIGF hospitals are in desperate need of physicians while other

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IIGF hospitals, in the same army area, have more physicians than patients. Both the IIGF Surgeon or Army Surgeon seem powerless to distribute these personnel equitably within the field armies, much less between field armies.

(b) It has been recommended on several occasions that the Surgeon should require a Beds and Patients Report from the IIGF hospitals in Tehran and the provinces. It is impossible for the Surgeon to establish priorities for assigning such personnel as orthopedic surgeons if he does not know which hospitals treat the greatest number of broken limbs. Consequently, we find specialists assigned where there is no need for their specialty and there are insufficient specialists where the needs are greatest.

(c) Many of the IIGF hospitals in the Field Army areas are being supplied directly by the Medical Depot in Tehran. The medical sections in the Field Army Depots are not always responsive in carrying out their supply responsibilities.

(2) It is felt that the problems of the IIGF Medical Service will not be solved until one man is made responsible. We have recommended a greater degree of centralized control and will continue in our efforts to convince the IIGF of the need to adopt this concept.

m. MAP Medical Equipment

Efforts are continuously made to encourage the IIGF to refurbish the \$600,000 inventory of MAP medical equipment currently stored in the Field Army Depots. These kits have deteriorated, the drugs are out of date and many of the components are missing. They are useless in their present condition and are taking up critical storage space. Recommendations have been submitted to inspect the kits and discard those that are unusable; issue to the local hospitals and field units the kits that are usable; and return to Tehran those kits which need repair and replacement items. This will continue to be stressed.

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**SECTION III - AREAS WHERE PROGRESS IS LESS THAN SATISFACTORY (C)**

a. As has been noted throughout this report, the importance of dealing with counterparts in a "Sales Environment" is probably the single most important factor in successful advisory relations. This section is designed for key advisory personnel, with a need to know, reporting in to the Army Section and ARMISH/MAAG J-Staff. It gives some background not generally noted in cables or other records which have affected the advisory relationship. These are personal observations gathered over two years which may be useful. Most of them were only "discovered" in the latter part of my tour when a close rapport had been developed with my counterparts and they felt they could discuss a subject rather freely without -- "hurting my feelings". As was frequently noted, "Yes my dear general, you are right, it would be fine if we could do it -- but this is Persia."

b. There have been some areas where the advisory efforts have not met with desired results. This can be attributed to many reasons. Cultural differences, past experiences of the Shah as well as military and civilian leaders, lack of qualified personnel in IIGF, shortage of properly trained US personnel to do the job due to cut-backs, and in some instances the high cost of doing business in today's armies. It also may well be that the IIGF felt the recommended program to be relatively unimportant when considered in conjunction with other projects to which the Iranians have given higher priority. It must be recognized that in a sales environment, the saying that they are "steering the ship" is not lip service as sometimes is true under MAP, but a fact of life. This is Persia in a Sales Era!

c. When dealing with advisory problems in Iran it is important to note that the Shah not only reigns, he rules and commands. And most important he realizes that the Army is the major factor which helped him keep the Tudeh party from taking over Tehran and Northern Iran in 1945 and 1946 and which supported him in the attack to drive the communist supported independent government out of Azerbaijan in 1946. And, also most important, furnished the support needed to defeat Mossadegh in August 1953. On the part of the Army they realize that it was the Shah's leadership in 1946 which held the country together when the British were advising compromise with the Soviets and even the US Ambassador was giving less than whole hearted support to the Shah's attempts to regain Azerbaijan which was then under a separatist communist government. To provide an understanding of the crucible which formed many basic ideas that are still prevalent in Iran today is beyond the scope of this paper. It is recommended, however, that all personnel concerned with Iranian problems read the Shah's book "Mission For My Country": Dealing with Iranian problems without reading this book, would be like dealing with the problems of Germany prior to World War II without having read "Mein Kampf".

d. (1) As was previously noted, in the introduction, the problem of Command relationships has posed many difficulties to what we consider orderly procedures and proper staff work. What must be realized is that this system does

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not exist inadvertently, because the Iranians don't understand our system of operations with a Joint Staff, Service Chiefs, and so forth. But it has been designed carefully by HIM to ensure that the power bases -- the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie -- report directly to HIM. Thus, under this system there is no single military chief who controls all the power. The Chief, SCS acts as the head of the Supreme Staff which will function to coordinate and control the joint forces which may be fielded in time of war. Up to that point, each service chief "runs his own show". The Chief, SCS and his staff have rather vague undefined rules under which they operate which serve as a check on the powers of the individual service chiefs on certain matters such as TOEs, make up of divisions, etc. Most of these matters fall in the field of IIGF because most officers on the SCS staff are Army Officers.

(2) As can be imagined at these meetings between a service chief and his sovereign, who is personally interested in upgrading all his military forces, matters are often casually discussed which are then taken as a directive by the CG, IIGF who is naturally eager to prove his efficiency in carrying out HIM's desires. The result here on force structure planning has been hasty.

(3) Another factor is the independent purchasing of material for the IIGF which has not been programmed as required by the Ground Forces. For example, the unexpected buy of 36 UH1H and 70 Bell Jet Ranger Helicopters for the IIGF, and the recent purchase of 136 130MM artillery guns from the Russians for the IIGF are demonstrative. There have been two explanations given me for this. First, since Iran doesn't have its own armament factories it must stockpile this war material so it will be available in the event of war. Second, this is done in order to put the Ground Forces under pressure. If there is equipment stored in the warehouses, the Shah can "pressure" the IIGF to extend themselves to integrate it into their units. Not a good solution from our viewpoint, but as I am told when I discuss this point -- "This is Persia".

(4) Another factor which has been discussed in some detail concerns the attempts to develop a Five Year Force Structure complete with cost estimates. A point here which serves as an excellent illustration of the problems we face in this field is the following. In 1968, the IIGF was informed that the military's budget for the next fiscal year would be increased by only 10%. ARMISH/MAAG directed the service section chiefs to assist their respective services in programming their next year's budget with this in mind. I and my staff were completely unsuccessful. The IIGF put in a budget which required an increase of approximately 60%. They finally received an increase of approximately 23%. After this I was called on and told by General Zarghami, then the CG, IIGF, "My dear general -- see, if I had followed your advice they would have cut that 10% to 8 or 7%. As it was I put in for more than I expected to get knowing they would cut me some." He then gave me the advice that I was to hear so frequently in the next year, "Don't worry, this is Persia, some things we must do our own way".

(5) The above must be considered when attempting to develop a 5 year program or any other plan. It is being strongly resisted at IIGF level, not only because they don't understand it, but because at this time they don't want it and see no need for it. In fact, I was told that the last thing they wanted was to develop

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an American System which will allow a "civilian budget type" to "get into military business". As a result, I feel that only by starting this system at National Level will we be able to force the IIGF to endeavor to develop a 5 year plan and cost it. Even then unless the continual series of ACSFOR changes which come out monthly or even weekly from high level meetings cease, even with a will to develop the costing plan and the ability, which they don't now have, they will be unable to develop a sound program upon which definitive plans can be developed. Caution is recommended in "pushing" this program at IIGF level beyond what they are willing to do. This is an area where they are extremely sensitive not only not accepting advice, but actually resenting it in many cases. Once a national level program has been sold, and there is evidence that this is the case, the integration of the IIGF portion would then be the time to go "all out" to assist them in developing a workable plan.

e. Following is a recap by staff sections where progress has been less than satisfactory.

### **SECTION IIIA - PERSONNEL (C)**

#### **a. 3d Lieutenant Program**

The shortage of officers is a major continuing problem. Although the Imperial Iranian Military Academy has been expanded, it will still not meet the growing demands for additional regular officers. A lack of additional facilities and instructors for further expansion and the continual failure of the IIGF to meet quotas because of competition from civilian business has prevented recognizable progress in this area. A 3d Lt program similar to the US OCS program has been recommended as a means of providing a source for additional officers. However, although this recommendation was disapproved by HIM for the IIGF a similar program is in being for other services.

#### **b. Reserve Officer Training Program (US)**

The use of US ROTC as a possible additional source for Commissioned Officers has been strongly recommended. However, the program has met with general resistance. The problem appears to be a reluctance on the part of the GOI to provide accurate information on a widespread basis on the advantages of the program. For example, of the 40 initially reported as possibly attending US Colleges or Universities starting in September 1969, only two have been positively identified by the US Department of Defense as enrolled in ROTC.

#### **c. Grade Imbalance in the Officer Corps**

Past studies reveal a critical grade imbalance in the IIGF Officer Corps. Unless a system of temporary promotion is devised, this grade imbalance is projected to continue for the foreseeable future.

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**SECTION IIIB - PLANS, TRAINING, AND INTELLIGENCE (C)**

**a. IIGF Reorganization**

(1) The political implications of the introduction of new and modern equipment into the IIGF inventory, particularly in light of the impending withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf and the Shah's desire to fill the vacuum created thereby, have resulted in a continuing series of changes to the original force goal. These changes have occurred on an almost daily basis thereby causing revision of plans, troop lists, etc., and a return to the start point to develop new data. This has caused undue frustration on the part of IIGF planners as well as ARSEC advisors involved in this activity. Most of these changes have come about not because of tactical necessity but because of a desire for a modern piece of equipment or for a specified number of items, i.e., 1110 tanks, etc.

(2) The IIGF has never developed a program plan for a period in excess of 1 year. This is partially due to ethnic and sociological reasons. The Iranian military's psychology is such that planning into the future is a foreign idea and management procedures are practically nonexistent. Through advice in this area, this trend is changing but it is a major drawback to the development of a systematic approach to force development.

(3) The IIGF has undergone six reorganizations since 1962. As a result, before one reorganization has been completed, another has been initiated. None have been carried through to completion. This is especially true of the IIGF Logistical System since combat unit force goals have changed so frequently that the development of a logistical unit plan to support them has never got off the ground.

**b. Aviation**

(1) The major problem encountered by ARSEC in assisting and advising the IIGF with this expansion program is the fact that contractual agreements between the GOI and Agusta-Bell are confidential between them and details have not been known to ARSEC. Therefore, advisory assistance has been most difficult and had to be accomplished on a crash basis as information became available.

(2) The IIGF programmed expansion of aviation overextended considerably its available trained manpower which would have had a definite effect on their ability to maintain their HH-43 helicopter fleet. Based on ARMISH/MAAG's recommendation, all IIGF HH-43s have been or will be transferred to the IIGF or State Police.

**c. Airborne Brigade**

We have been unable to establish an effective alert system that will provide the capability of having one airborne team prepared to depart to an objective area within two hours with the remainder of the airborne task force prepared

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to depart within four hours. Our effort in this area has been hindered for three reasons: (1) Funds from IIGF have not been available, (2) IIAF has been reluctant to provide aircraft required to conduct an exercise of this size, and (3) the Brigade S-3 has not planned for or recommended a Brigade FTX feeling that he wouldn't get the planes.

d. Schools and Replacement Training Centers

(1) Although DCSIT, IIGF was established it has not succeeded in fulfilling its basic requirements. DCSIT has failed to update information on school capabilities, did not publish a school loading plan or school catalog for 1969-70, did not publish an adequate training ammunition allocation plan to support the increased training requirement and was remiss in its responsibility to get out and supervise or inspect the training being conducted. However, the failure of the IIGF to establish a firm force structure for planning purposes greatly hindered the development and publication of adequate training plans.

(2) Although IIGF increased the rate of construction of facilities the construction program was inadequate due to the relocation of schools and the increased training load which were unplanned.

(3) Frequent moves of technical and administrative service schools in Tehran were made by IIGF. These moves were made without advance notice to the school commandants or the advisors, with no prior planning, preparations, or discussion of the feasibility of the moves with the commandants. After numerous letters and recommendations by Army Section, IIGF made additional relocations of some schools to better, but still inadequate, facilities and has initiated prior planning in conjunction with ARSEC Advisors for the contemplated move of the Support Training Center to Tabriz.

(4) The IIGF has been directed by HIN to man their training base at 100% of authorized strength. This they have not done. The reason they have not done so is the overall shortage of qualified personnel. Again, they have failed to establish the necessary priorities to support their training base. Recently they have urgently requested US advisory support in the schools. In my opinion they are only attempting to avoid the issue and place responsibility for the failure of the training base on the US instead of where it properly belongs. Again, unless they are willing to assume the responsibility and do something themselves and support the schools with qualified personnel and funds, advisory assistance will not do the job.

e. Signal

(1) IIGF has been urged to use existing long-range fixed-plant communication networks in a tactical interface role so that by the time the INTS is completed they will have personnel trained and experienced in these procedures. IIGF and SCS both have refused to implement this potentially important aspect of communications training.

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(2) Very little progress has been made in updating and modernizing the Signal Training Center due to the lack of qualified instructors. Outmoded classrooms and laboratory facilities is also a contributing factor. Lack of adequate funds has been a key factor in this area.

### **f. Artillery (ADA & Field)**

(1) The overriding problem in both ADA and Field Artillery is lack of adequate communications coupled with an acute shortage of officer personnel. In the ADA area, current plans are for the IIAF to have overall responsibility with IIGF having responsibility for selected target areas. The Communications problem will be relieved when adequate radar and commo is made available to mesh with Air Force systems and create a warning capability to provide adequate reaction times.

(2) Planning for air defense of the division forward area must include a follow on system for twin 57MM weapons. The weapon is a maintenance problem and lacks an accurate fire control system against the sophisticated aircraft of today and the foreseeable future.

## **SECTION IIIC - LOGISTICS (C)**

### **a. Functionalization of the IIGF Logistical System**

It has been agreed between ARSEC and the IIGF that a functionalized logistical system would result in economies of personnel and resources. To achieve a functionalized system within the IIGF, mechanization of existing technical service department systems and improved communications is necessary. Progress has been slow in developing an organization for mechanized operations and obtaining and training the personnel that will have to operate the system. However, the framework for establishing an effective machine oriented system has now been developed by the IIGF. A chief of ADP operations has been designated. He will coordinate all ADP and EAM operations with the technical service departments and SCS. Two US systems analysts will be hired to assist in developing programs and training programmers and future progress in this area should be made at a much faster pace than during the past two years. The construction of an Integrated Telecommunications System will provide the necessary communications system to support the IIGF logistical system.

### **b. Ammunition Renovation**

(1) One of the basic requirements of an effective ammunition renovation program is to establish adequate standing operating procedures (SOP). Adequate SOPs have not yet been written. Another problem area is in planning, programming, and reporting. A need exists to establish a suitable system in these areas. One of the basic reasons for these problems is the fact that the Ammunition Renovation Planning Offices, both at Ammunition Command and at the depot level, are understaffed due to a lack of adequately trained ammunition personnel.

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(2) There is a lack of an adequate supply of water at the Korramabad Depot to effectively operate the new renovation facility presently under construction. Studies have been made by the IIGF Engineer Department but more progress is needed here.

c. Sale of Disposable MAP Property

A large quantity of MAP provided material has been declared excess by IIGF and released for local disposal by ARSEC. However, the majority of these items have not been sold. This is partially due to the sales procedures employed by the IIGF. Under these procedures a sales commission establishes a price for the excess items prior to opening the bids for the items. In the majority of the sales the highest bid is less than the established price. The result is that the items are not sold as the sales commission is hesitant to sell the material for less than the established price for fear of being subjected to criticism. This problem is particularly serious since needed warehouse space is being used to store spare parts for equipment no longer in the IIGF inventory. The creation of a centralized property operation utilizing modern sales techniques and placing emphasis on sales would assist in disposing of these excess items more expeditiously. This is visualized in the reorganization concepts recently developed by the IIGF.

d. 5th Echelon Repair and Rebuild

(1) The IIGF lacks an adequate 5th Echelon maintenance capability for the following reasons:

Shortage of trained officers.

Shortage of trained NCO and civilian technicians.

Inadequate programming of spare parts to support the maintenance programs.

(2) The construction of a rebuild plant as a part of the M-47 retrofit program envisages an overhaul facility for all IIGF equipment. This will be contractor operated, using civilian personnel and when in operation should take care of the total IIGF rebuild requirement and release many military personnel to IIGF units where skills are required.

e. Care and Preservation of Major End Items in Storage

IIGF has a requirement to train personnel in the care and preservation required for the storage of wheeled and tracked vehicles. ARSEC obtained spaces for a course of instruction with the US Army in Germany. However, the IIGF was unable to send personnel because of a lack of funds. This situation will get worse and the IIGF should reconsider their earlier decision.

f. Medical Service Corps (MSC)

Iran in general and the IIGF in particular does not have sufficient physicians to fill their needs. The IIGF is using physicians in positions of supply,

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training, and plans which could be easily handled by MSCs. Fifteen officers were commissioned as MSCs about six years ago. No additional personnel have been trained due to an inadequate number of officers entering the military service. We have recommended that the training of MSCs receive a higher priority in order to eliminate the use of physicians to perform MSC tasks. A recommendation was submitted during the Imperial Household Inspection of the IIGF Surgeon's Office in December 1969. There has been no response to this recommendation to date. An increase in MSC slots would decrease the requirements for medical officers in military units, especially in the Tehran area.

**8. MAP Medical Equipment**

(1) Eight years ago the IIGF was given approximately \$600,000 of various field medical kits under the MAP program. These kits have been in storage in the field army depots in Kermanshah, Mashad, and Marighah since their arrival in-country. Inspections by ARMISH/MAAG medical advisory personnel show that the contents of these kits are deteriorated, out-dated and in many instances incomplete. We have recommended that these kits be inspected and:

- (a) Discard those items that are no longer usable.
- (b) Issue the serviceable kits to the local IIGF hospitals and field units.
- (c) Return to Tehran those kits that have been damaged or are missing components.

(2) This has been brought to the attention of the Medical Depot, the IIGF Surgeon, the Medical Director, SCS and J-4, SCS. A meeting was held in September with representatives from the above offices and a directive was sent to the IIGF Surgeon requesting appropriate action be taken. No results have been noted to date. Since many items are missing from the kits it is difficult to get the Iranians to touch them. Thus, they continue to deteriorate. Appropriate follow-up action must be taken.

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